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SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
"I know, up on top you are seeing great sights, but down
on the bottom we, too, should have rights." Dr. Seuss l
This Article applies the analytical paradigm of the Supreme Court's
newest Eighth Amendment decision (summer 2008) to assess the
constitutionality of public school corporal punishment. The
application of this precedent, and other twenty-first century cases like
it, demonstrate that school paddlings have become inconsistent with
modern standards of decency and disproportionate to typical
schoolchildren 's misbehavior-two central benchmarks of a violation
under the Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. This
Article, as a threshold matter, also exposes the serious errors and
omissions underlying the Court's 1977 decision holding that such
punishment is totally immune from the Clause 's protections. Both
strands of this Article, the one focused on the present and the one
looking into the past, provide information and analyses which have
not been previously published.
I. INTRODUCTION
We humans are a willful lot, determined to have enough control over
our surroundings to survive and, better still, to flourish.2 But, these
surroundings include other people whose inclinations and modus
operandi may conflict with or thwart our own. Being an ingenious
species, we have devised a range of strategies to force, manipulate, or
cajole others to the realization that our way wisdom lies. The strategies
run the spectrum from physical compulsion at one extreme to education
and therapy on the other. History is a veritable lurching about, from
waging just and unjust wars3 to spreading gospel and propagating isms
1. DR. SEUSS, YERTLE THE TURTLE AND OTHER STORIES (Random House 1986) (1904)
(unpaginated).
2. To assert that human beings want to survive and flourish is probably a truism. Nevertheless,
for observations to the same general effect, see, for example, ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS
1-20 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998); JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS (1980), reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195, 201-03 (2d ed. 1995); ANTON MYRER, THE BIG WAR
476-77 (1957); RAINER MARIA RILKE, The Ninth Elegy, in THE SELECTED POETRY OF RAINER MARIA
RILKE 199-203 (Stephen Mitchell ed. & trans., 1989).
3. Without venturing into the myriad military clashes of earlier epochs, the persistence of war is
all too well exemplified by the self-induced carnage of the twentieth century alone. See STEPHEN E.
AMBROSE & DOUGLAS G. BRINKLEY, RISE TO GLOBALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1938, at
1-51, 114-26, 190-253 (8th ed. 1997) (discussing World War II, the Korean War, and the war in
2009] 1329
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via word of mouth or text.4
Current events attest that there is no shortage of military and other
strong-arm solutions to the problem of control in the modem era.5 Yet,
as we stumble through the millennia, there has been an almost
imperceptible attitudinal shift: we seem to like these sorts of solutions
less and less. The most palpable evidence of this shift in thinking has
thus far been expressed in the development of the law.6 Over the last
sixty years, international law has heralded a slowly actualizing penchant
for gentler, more compassionate methods, with proscriptions on, for
example, cross-border wars of aggression, 7 genocide, 8 and torture,9 This
is new-a genuinely nascent body of law within the time line of the
human enterprise. 1
0
Consistent with the evolving shift on the international plane, domestic
law has also gradually foresworn legalized "disciplinary" physical
violence towards adults who once had been its victims, i.e., African
Americans at the hands of slavemasters in the antebellum South, wives
at the mercy of husbands, and sailors and prisoners at the whim of their
Vietnam, among many other military conflicts).
4. In an excess of conscientious footnoting, here follows some examples to support the
proposition that people verbalize ideas to each other: STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY passim (2002); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A DREAM: WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD passim (James Melvin Washington ed., HarperCollins
Publishers 1986); ALEX KOZULIN, VYGOTSKY'S PSYCHOLOGY: A BIOGRAPHY OF IDEAS passim (1990);
KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), reprinted in
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY READINGS FROM PLATO TO GANDHI 344-56 (John Somerville &
Ronald E. Santoni eds., Anchor Books 1963); THE BIBLE passim; William Kristol, Op-Ed, Be Afraid
Please., N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2008, at A21.
5. See, e.g., Barry Bearak & Celia W. Dugger, Assassins in Zimbabwe Aim at the Grass Roots,
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2008, at Al; Steven Lee Myers, Bush Praises Pakistan Just Hours After a U.S.
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A6; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Sabrina Tavernise, Ethnic Clashes
and Bombers Kill 61 in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A1; Kashmir: India Reports Clashes with
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2008, at A8.
6. See infra notes 373-422 and accompanying text.
7. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (providing that all members "shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations").
8. E.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
9. E.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, 1, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(Dec. 10, 1984) (requiring each state party to "take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction").
10. With the exception of certain humanitarian law principles established in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, most international humanitarian law and virtually all international human
rights law post-dates the end of World War 11 in 1945. See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 58-142 (3d ed. 2007).
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superiors." There is one group of people, however, many of the
members of which have not yet been given such sanctuary by our
laws--children. Legal corporal punishment is still routinely used on
them in numerous twenty-first century American schoolhouses, among
other venues.'
2
That corporal punishment remains standard operating procedure in so
many of this nation's public schools is due, in no small part, to the
single and singular 1977 Supreme Court decision in Ingraham v.
Wright.13 The singularity is a function of the factual and legal errors,
some critical, which pervade the majority opinion.14 Indeed, this Article
not only disentangles strands of enigmatic judicial reasoning as law
review articles are wont to do, 15 but also goes where none have gone
before in presenting an investigation of the primary sources assembled
by the Justices in support of the decision.' 6 The results are not pretty,
and they throw into question what weight courts should give Ingraham
in the future. However, even assuming arguendo that the case had a
credible basis in the first place, this Article demonstrates that the Court's
own recent Eighth Amendment holdings have made Ingraham an
anachronism in urgent need of overturning. 17
II. PUBLIC SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: DEFINITION AND
PREVALENCE
Before proceeding to a full description of Ingraham's holding and
extensive analysis of its infirmities, it will smooth the way to first
clearly define the phrase "corporal punishment of children" as well as to
limn a thumbnail sketch of its incidence in the United States.
Corporal punishment of children, no matter who dispenses it, where it
11. MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA passim (1984). Two qualifications need to be made
to the statement above that the law protects prisoners from corporal punishment. First, with certain
constitutionally mandated exemptions, the death penalty remains available to punish capital crimes in
various American jurisdictions. See Dora W. Klein, Categorical Exclusions from Capital Punishment:
How Many Wrongs Make a Right?, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1211, 1212-15 (2007); Andrew Ditchfield,
Note, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the Application of Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO.
L.J. 801, 802 (2007). Second, authorities' use of physical force on a prisoner which causes him or her to
suffer only de minimis injuries should not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, unless the force is
of a type repellant to the norms of mankind. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992).
12. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
13. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision).
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See id.
16. See infra Part III.C.2.
17. See infra Part IV.B.3.
2009] 1331
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is dispensed, or with what degree of severity it is dispensed, may be
defined as follows: the use of physical force upon a child with the
intention of causing the child to experience bodily pain so as to correct
or punish the child's behavior. 18 As such, this punishment is a form of
physical violence.
Lest some question this conclusion, it answers much to compare
corporal punishment of children with assault or battery, a crime of
physical violence. Assault or battery (different states use one or the other
term to designate the same crime) may be accurately described as an
"unlawful application of force to the person of another" resulting in
"either a bodily injury" or, in some states, a mere "offensive touching."' 19
Under the modem approach exemplified by the Model Penal Code, in
order to constitute criminal assault, the attack must cause "bodily
injury, ' 2° defined as, among other things, "physical pain, illness or any
impairment of physical condition. .. ,,21 Even a "temporarily painful
blow" to another will be a battery "though afterward there is no wound
or bruise or even pain to show for it." 22 The perpetrator must also have
the mental state of intending to cause bodily pain or injury to another
person.23
Even so-called reasonable corporal punishment of children is
characterized by the above-described elements of assault and battery.
Whether "reasonable" or more acute, corporal punishment of children is,
at the very least, a temporarily painful blow intended to modify behavior
by causing bodily pain.24 Indeed, if the punisher was to physically touch
the child so as to induce a sensation milder than pain, the act would be a
tap, a tickle, a caress or hug, and would lose its punitive value.
Affirmation, if affirmation is needed, that corporal punishment of
children is violence may be found in the 2006 "Report of the
Independent Expert for the United Nations Study on Violence against
Children, 25 which defines "violence against children" as "the
18. SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATION, at xix (2006).
19. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 16.2, at 815-16 (4th ed. 2003); see Miguel Angel
Mendez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach to Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407,
411-12 (1995).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1997); LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 16.2, at 816 n.6.
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.0 (emphasis added).
22. LAFAVE, supra note 19, § 16.2, at 816.
23. See id.
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. The Secretary-General, Report of the Independent Expert for the United Nations Study on
Violence Against Children, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/299 (Aug. 29, 2006),
available at http://www.violencestudy.org/IMG/df/English-2-2.pdf.
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intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against a
child, by an individual or group, that either results in or has a high
likelihood of resulting in actual or potential harm to the child's health,
survival, development or dignity., 26 The study explicitly subsumes
within this formulation all corporal punishment of children.
27
It should be noted that corporal punishment, as understood in this
Article, excludes physically restraining children to prevent them from
imminently injuring themselves or others or from imminently damaging
property 2 8-- an exclusion often recognized in state laws outlawing
school corporal punishment.29 Nor should this Article be erroneously
pigeonholed as a diatribe on the purported virtues of permissiveness in
educating children. Like many experts on child development, I subscribe
to the proposition that adults must set limits for children and that
children should nonviolently be taught to adhere to those limits.
30
With respect to prevalence, federal statistics for 2006-2007 show that
223,190 children were corporally punished in public schools (hereinafter
school corporal punishment), usually with wooden paddles. 31  The
punishment has led to injuries prompting approximately 10,000 to
20,000 students to seek medical treatment each year.
32
While 223,190 children admittedly represents a small fraction of this
country's school-age population,33 there is, as will be explained later in
26. Id. 8, at 6 (drawing from the definition in WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON
VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 5 (Etienne G. Krug et al. eds., 2002)).
27. Id. 26, 50.
28. E.g., BITENSKY, supra note 18, at xx.
29. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-18(6) (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 37G(a)-(b)
(2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1312(3)-(4) (2008).
30. See, e.g., PENELOPE LEACH, YOUR GROWING CHILD: FROM BABYHOOD THROUGH
ADOLESCENCE 205-08, 211-13, 217 (1989) (outlining the appropriate nature and role of discipline as
varying with a child's age); ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD-
REARING AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 177 (Hildegarde Hannum & Hunter Hannum trans., 1990)
(discouraging permissiveness in child rearing); WILLIAM SEARS & MARTHA SEARS, THE DISCIPLINE
BOOK: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO HAVE A BETTER-BEHAVED CHILD: FROM BIRTH TO AGE
TEN 158-59 (1995); cf BENJAMIN SPOCK, DR. SPOCK ON PARENTING: SENSIBLE, REASSURING ADVICE
FOR TODAY'S PARENT 145-53 (1988) (refuting that the absence of corporal punishment is the equivalent
of permissive parenting).
31. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS), Corporal Punishment in
U.S. Public Schools, http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=statesbanning (last visited July 26,
2008) (predicating the statistic on data from the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil
Rights).
32. Society for Adolescent Medicine, Corporal Punishment in Schools: Position Paper of the
Society for Adolescent Medicine, 32 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 385, 386 (2003).
33. According to the 2000 Census, there were 61,297,467 children between the ages of five and
nineteen living in the United States at that time. JULIE MEYER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS BRIEF:
AGE: 2000 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrOl-12.pdf [hereinafter
CENSUS BRIEF].
2009] 1333
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this Article, tremendous cause for concern from the standpoint of human
suffering and child endangerment. 34 Indeed, to put the situation in
perspective, consider for a moment the probable outrage and concern if
it came to light that 200,000 adult law students underwent such
disciplinary corporal assaults at the hands of their professors during even
one academic year. In spite of the traditional "rough and tumble" typical
of a law school classroom, news of Socratic grillings gone physical
would assuredly be a first-class scandal.
III. INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT
A. Facts and Holding
As previously mentioned, the continued longevity of legalized school
corporal punishment in parts of the United States is the constitutional
legacy of Ingraham v. Wright.35  The case was precipitated by
"exceptionally harsh" paddlings of two students at a Florida public
junior high school. 36 One boy, while being pinned atop a table in the
principal's office, was given more than twenty whacks because he did
not respond to his teacher's instructions with the desired alacrity.37 The
paddling was "so severe" that the child suffered a hematoma requiring
medical intervention and his absence from school for several days.38 The
other boy was paddled multiple times for "minor infractions," with one
of these sessions disabling him from the full use of his arm for a week.39
The Court held, among other things,40 that the students had no viable
claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
34. See infra notes 471-90 and accompanying text.
35. 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (5-4 decision).
36. Id. at 657. At the time that petitioners were paddled, Florida legislation and a local school
board regulation authorized the use of disciplinary corporal punishment on students in petitioners'
public school. Id. at 655. The state statute's authorization was by negative inference inasmuch as the
statute prohibited corporal punishment which was "degrading or unduly severe" or which was carried
out in the absence of prior discussion with the principal or teacher in charge of the school. Id. (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 232.27 (1961)).
37. Id. at 657.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Besides its adjudication of the Eighth Amendment issue that is the focus of this Article, the
Ingraham Court also held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not necessitate
notice and a hearing prior to administering corporal punishment on a child in a public elementary or
secondary school. Id. at 680-82. The Due Process Clause of that Amendment asserts: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . U..." .S  CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Court so held even though it also ruled "that corporal punishment in public
schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest" under the Clause. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at
672.
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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 41 This is an extreme ruling; it
means that the Eighth Amendment does not exist for children when they
enter the schoolhouse. It means that no child in this country can seek the
Amendment's protection against physical punishment meted out by
schools, regardless of how grotesque or excruciating that punishment
may be and though it could cause death.42 Less dramatically but just as
importantly, the case means that, as a federal constitutional matter, it has
been left within the political discretion of the states whether or not to
prohibit the practice.43
B. Time to Reconsider?
Ingraham turned thirty years old in 2007, its age bespeaking many a
child's rendez-vous with the paddle.4 The incidence of students being
hit was greater in the twentieth century than in its successor,45 but if one
uses the government's statistic of 223,190 schoolchildren physically
punished per year46 for thirty years, then surely millions of children were
disciplined in this way by school personnel between 1977 and 2007.
41. Id. at 653-71. The Eighth Amendment states in full: "Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
The Eighth Amendment restrains the federal government, but was incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause so as to be applicable also to the states. Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660, 666-69 (1962).
42. In dissent, Justice White wrote:
Today the Court holds that corporal punishment in public schools, no matter how severe,
can never be the subject of the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment .... [T]he
majority would afford the student no protection no matter how inhumane and barbaric the
punishment inflicted on him might be.... I only take issue with the extreme view of the
majority that corporal punishment in public schools, no matter how barbaric, inhumane,
or severe, is never limited by the Eighth Amendment.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 683, 691-92 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
43. Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment. The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense-
Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 427; see Tamar Ezer, A
Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 18 (2004) (referring
indirectly to Ingraham's impact as relegating school corporal punishment to the states).
44. The exact date that the Supreme Court decided Ingraham was April 19, 1977. 430 U.S. at
651.
45. Both legal reform and changing mores are responsible for the steadily declining incidence of
public school corporal punishment. For example, when Ingraham was handed down in 1977, only three
states prohibited the punishment as a matter of state law. See infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
Since that time, twenty-five more states have followed suit while many local school districts have
exercised delegated authority to ban the practice on a district by district basis within the remaining
twenty-two states continuing to permit the practice under state law. See infra notes 313-15 and
accompanying text. This trend has been complemented by a similar evolution in the thinking of
educators. See infra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
46. The statistic of 223,190 schoolchildren corporally punished per year is the one provided by
the federal government for 2006-2007. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Though not a reason for overturning precedent, some commiseration
and second thoughts in the face of these millions, and a belated pause
marking Ingraham's thirtieth anniversary, would seem to warrant a
critical re-examination of the decision. It is an ideal opportunity for
examining whether the Ingraham Court's rationales and research were
sound when the case was decided, and whether, in light of intervening
significant legal, scientific, and attitudinal developments, the holding
has become obsolete anyway.47
C. Analysis of the Ingraham Court's Rationales
The children's Eighth Amendment argument in Ingraham was that
the school corporal punishment administered to them violated the
Amendment's Clause against governmental infliction of cruel and
unusual punishments. 48 The Supreme Court's chief rationale for
repudiating the argument was that the Clause is a constraint exclusively
on judicially rendered criminal law punishments of convicts;
consequently, the Clause could not protect children from public school
disciplinary penalties. 49 The Court conceived the stinginess of the
Clause's reach as the necessary outgrowth of stare decisis and original
intent.
50
1. Debunking the Stare Decisis Rationale
a. Inapposite Authorities
In trying to verify the proposition that precedents circumscribe the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to formal judicial sentencing in
criminal cases, the Ingraham Court primarily relied upon Fong Yue Ting
v. United States51 and Uphaus v. Wyman. 52 The Ingraham majority
maintained that these two cases are quintessential examples of the
Court's unfailing sequestration of the Amendment from "claims that
impositions outside the criminal process constitute[] cruel and unusual
punishment." 53 Yet, the Ingraham majority opinion offers little more
than terse squibs about these decisions and does not even hint at the
47. See infra Parts III-IV.
48. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653-7 1.
49. Id. at 664-71.
50. Id. at 664-68.
51. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
52. 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667-68.
53. 430 U.S. at 667-68.
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outsize impediments to assigning them this starring role in the stare
decisis script.54
Even assuming that Fong Yue Ting and Uphaus lent themselves to
such casting, ultimately nothing could be gained by the effort. As this
Article will illustrate, there are numerous other Supreme Court cases in
which the Clause has been extended to situations beyond judicial
sentencing of criminals." It was thus impossible for Fong Yue Ting and
Uphaus to show that the Court had limited the Clause's application
exclusively to judicial sentencing of criminals. The very most the cases
could show was that the Court had sometimes been of two minds on the
subject.
There is, though, a more fundamental shortcoming in Ingraham's use
of Fong Yue Ting and Uphaus; neither case suits the role. Chinese
nationals brought Fong Yue Ting under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause to contest their arrest and deportation for failure to have
certificates of residence as prescribed by federal statute.56 The litigation
was not brought under the Eighth Amendment, and the Court's holding
was not under the Eighth Amendment. 57 Rather, the Court held that the
Due Process Clause could not preclude the federal government from
exercising its constitutional plenary power to deport aliens. 8 It is a
mystery why the Ingraham Court referred to Fong Yue Ting as turning
upon the Eighth Amendment. Although the Fong Yue Ting majority
opinion is ornamented with an aside that deportation of aliens is not
punishment for a crime under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, the digression is dicta and without precedential value.
59
The mystery surrounding the Ingraham Justices' thinking only
deepens upon thorough inspection of Uphaus, the other decision
supposedly supporting Ingraham's stare decisis theory. According to the
Court in Uphaus, the "sole question" presented for disposition was
whether a state court's order to produce certain documents on pain of
contempt was valid.60 Appellant's main legal arguments were that state
authority to issue the order had been preempted by congressional
legislation, and that the order violated his rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the First Amendment Free Speech
54. Id.
55. See infra Part III.C. 1 .b.
56. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699 (comprising part of the statement of facts by Justice Gray).
57. Id. at 698-732; see Celia Rumann, Tortured History: Finding Our Way Back to the Lost
Origins of the Eighth Amendment, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 661,690-91 (2004).
58. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 699, 730.
59. Id. at 730; see Rumann, supra note 57, at 690-91.
60. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 75-76 (1959).
2009] 1337
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Clause.6' It was only at the eleventh hour, in front of the U.S. Supreme
Court, that appellant first raised the additional argument that his
incarceration for contempt of court was, in the Uphaus Justices' jumbled
phraseology, "such cruel and unusual punishment as to be a denial of
due process." 62 The Court, in the end, rejected all of appellant's
contentions. 63 Without specifically mentioning the Eighth Amendment
or any part thereof, the Uphaus majority upheld the contempt sanction
because appellant had had the documents "at hand," his failure to
produce had been intentional, the sanction was a "civil remedy," and he
had the "keys to freedom" at the ready.64 Uphaus is too unclear and
confusing in relation to the Eighth Amendment to be of much use in
effectuating the Ingraham Court's stare decisis project. As one
commentator aptly remarked in comparing Fong Yue Ting to Uphaus,
"Uphaus provides an even thinner reed for the Court to have relied upon
in Ingraham."
65
The Ingraham majority also tacked on string citations to its
superficial and incoherent treatment of Fong Yue Ting and Uphaus.
66
These citations, to Mahler v. Eby67 and Bugajewitz v. Adams,6 8 are not
accompanied by even a shred of parenthetical information. Presumably,
the Ingraham Justices themselves were not overly impressed with the
relevance of Mahler and Bugajewitz for stare decisis purposes, or they
would have expended a few sentences in explanation.
In fact, Mahler and Bugajewitz do not-and cannot-bolster the
proposition that the Eighth Amendment must be tethered to judicial
sentencing of criminals. In both cases, the Court held that deportation of
an alien is not a punishment. 69 The Court explicated in Mahler that it is
not possible for deportation of an alien to be a punishment because it is
always within the national government's sovereign power to expel
aliens. 70 If Mahler and Bugajewitz have anything to do with the Eighth
Amendment, it can only be in connection with aliens. But, the Mahler
and Bugajewitz opinions never once allude to the Eighth Amendment or
61. Id. at 74-75. Appellant's Due Process Clause claim was that the resolution authorizing the
order was too vague and that the order itself sought irrelevant documents. Id. at 75. His First
Amendment claim was that the order violated his free speech and association rights. Id.
62. Id. at 76.
63. Id. at 81-82.
64. Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 197 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting)).
65. Rumann, supra note 57, at 691.
66. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,668 (1977).
67. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
68. 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
69. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 39-46; Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 590-92.
70. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 39; accord Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 592.
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any of its clauses.71 This is not surprising since the Court adjudicated
those cases on the doctrinal basis of the deportations being within
governmental power, not of the deportations impinging upon the Eighth
Amendment.
b. Cases Which Apply the Eighth Amendment to Punishments Other than
Judicial Sentencing of Criminals
In the preceding section, this Article asserts that the Supreme Court
has often applied the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to
situations besides judicial sentencing of criminals. 72 Ingraham would
not have it so. Yet wishful thinking, even by the Court, cannot negate
reality.
One of the cases cited by Justice White's Ingraham dissent73 as
inconsistent with the majority's "stare decisis" is Estelle v. Gamble,74
decided one year before Ingraham. In Estelle, the Court held that prison
authorities' intentional disregard of an inmate's medical needs may
violate the constitutional interdiction on cruel and unusual
punishments. 75 Ignoring a prisoner's medical needs is obviously not a
judicially imposed sentence for perpetrating a crime.7 6 As will shortly be
71. Mahler, 264 U.S. at 73-82; Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 590-92.
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 688 & n.4 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
74. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
75. Id. at 103-05.
76. In Estelle, the formal sentence was imprisonment, not the prison authorities' denial of
medical care which respondent sued over. Id. at 98-101. The Supreme Court has observed that
unpleasant conditions of confinement are part of the cost of crime. The observation could be taken to
intimate that since the conditions are inherent in incarceration, they are a facet of the sentence. See, e.g.,
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347-49 (1981) (declaring that "the Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons"). Such an intimation, however, would be misleading over the long run. The Court
has adopted different standards for determining whether challenged governmental conduct violates the
Eighth Amendment, depending on whether the conduct is part of the formal sentence or constitutes
conditions of confinement. Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (explaining that infliction of pain in carrying out a sentence, in this instance the death penalty,
contravenes the Eighth Amendment if the pain is "unnecessary and wanton" and if the punishment is
grossly disproportional to the crime), with Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297-99, 301 n.2 (1991)
(elucidating that when an inmate challenges prison conditions that are not "specifically part of the
sentence," then, in order to prevail, he or she must show that a "sufficiently serious deprivation"
occurred and that the officials responsible for the deprivation possessed a "sufficiently culpable state of
mind"). See also Melvin Gutterman, The Contours of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence:
Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 376-78, 387-95 (1995) (tracing the development of
Eighth Amendment standards used exclusively to evaluate prison conditions rather than formal criminal
sentences); Jeff Zimmerman, Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 87 GEo. L.J. 1904, 1914-19
(1999) (summarizing differences as between Eighth Amendment standards applicable to formal criminal
sentences and standards applicable to attendant conditions of imprisonment). The existence of different
standards betokens that the Court does not, under the Amendment, equate formal criminal sentences
HeinOnline -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1339 2008-2009
1340 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol.77
discussed, Estelle's conception that generic conditions of prison life are
also actionable under the Eighth Amendment has become a staple of
constitutional law over the years."
Although the Ingraham dissenters did not mention it, they could also
have cited Trop v. Dulles,78 a Supreme Court precedent extending the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause not only beyond formal judicial
sentencing but also beyond the confines of the penitentiary. In Trop,
petitioner was an army private who had been convicted by court martial
for desertion during wartime and sentenced to three years hard labor,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge.79
Many years later, after serving his time, petitioner sought a passport.
The government rejected his application based upon a federal statute
decreeing that a person may lose his or her U.S. citizenship if convicted
of desertion and given a dishonorable discharge. 80 No court was
involved in deciding upon and issuing the rejection.81
Congressional legislation authorizing de-nationalization under these
circumstances is not judicial sentencing of a convict. Nor was Trop's
complaint even remotely related to prison conditions such as were
challenged in Estelle. Nevertheless, the Trop Court characterized the
congressionally decreed denationalization, applied after petitioner had
served his sentence, as indeed a punishment within the purview of the
Eighth Amendment,8 2 and held, among other things, 83 that such
denationalization contravened the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.84
Neither Estelle nor Trop were a mere slip of the pen, assuming
Justices' pens can slip for the length of two substantive opinions. These
cases have not been overturned by Ingraham or any other decision.
Quite the contrary, their teachings are still good law.85 For instance, a
with prison conditions-unless the latter were specifically included in the sentence.
77. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
78. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
79. Id. at 88.
80. Id.
81. The federal statute in issue in Trop made de-naturalization contingent upon a preceding court
martial and dishonorable discharge of a member of the armed forces for desertion during time of war. Id.
at 88 & n.l.
82. Id. at 95-97.
83. The Trop Court also struck down petitioner's denationalization on the ground that the
Constitution imbues Americans with a fundamental right of citizenship that "is not subject to the general
powers of the National Government and therefore cannot be divested in the exercise of those powers."
Id. at 92.
84. Id. at 103-04.
85. Trop has been cited by the Court in some of its most recent Eighth Amendment decisions.
E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-12 (2002). Estelle's continuing longevity is discussed in the
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modem-and representative-incarnation of Estelle may be found in
Helling v. McKinney.86 In Helling, the Supreme Court ruled that a
prisoner stated a cause of action under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause by alleging that the government had, with deliberate
indifference, exposed him to levels of second-hand cigarette smoke
posing an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health. 87 The
prisoner's exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke was manifestly not
part of his judicially mandated sentence.
Ingraham was, and is, glaringly out of sync with the line of precedent
finding punitive government conduct actionable under the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, regardless of the venue where or at whose
behest that conduct occurs. Stare decisis does not support the outcome in
Ingraham, either when it was decided or at present, of withholding all
Eighth Amendment protection from children who are physically
chastised in the public schools. If the law unquestionably required this
result, then that would be that, barring an amendment to the Constitution
or a revolutionary change of course by the Court. What is disturbing is
that the Ingraham Court's effective deviation from stare decisis, in the
name of stare decisis, was a needless and unsupportable abrogation of a
source of constitutional protection for schoolchildren.
2. Debunking the Original Intent Rationale
The second serious flaw in the Ingraham majority's reasoning
concerns its originalist interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause so as to restrict the provision's effect to criminal
88
sentencing. 88 The flaw inheres in two respects: the originalism argument
is exquisitely flimsy to begin with, and does not square with the
Clause's self-evident textualism.
The flimsiness stems from the fact that the Ingraham Justices
text above.
In passing, it is interesting to meditate, even if only superficially, on the Supreme Court's
discussion of the reach of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause (proclaiming that
government must not impose excessive fines) in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). The Court
there stated: "The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division
between the civil and the criminal law.... [T]he question is not.., whether forfeiture ... is civil or
criminal, but rather whether it is punishment." Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
447-48 (1989)). See Gregory Y. Porter, Note, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's Ongoing
Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 541-43 (1997)
(interpreting the Austin Court as having articulated the view that the Eighth Amendment in general is not
limited to criminal proceedings).
86. 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
87. Id. at 35.
88. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-66 (1977).
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provided absolutely no direct evidence of original intent to shore up
their interpretation. The majority substituted, in lieu thereof, their own
attenuated inferences drawn from certain historic documents of limited
interest to this particular originalist endeavor. 89 Moreover, the Justices'
selection of documents was incomplete and lopsided; there was contrary
historic evidence then available to the Court concerning the probable
import of the Clause. 90
To be precise, the documents cited by the majority in Ingraham are
the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Virginia Declaration of Rights
of 1776. 91 Because the Court found the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause was derived from the Virginia Declaration
which allegedly had gotten the language from the prohibition on vicious
punishments in the English Bill, 9 the majority focused on the intent
undergirding the latter.93 The Justices concluded, from the historical
circumstances preceding the English Bill's adoption, that it was meant to
curb ruthless judicial sentencing in enforcing the criminal laws during
the reign of James II. The Justices inferred that the foregoing provision
of the English Bill had only that one purpose and no other.94 Then, from
this initial inference, they inferred again that such must be the exclusive
meaning of the analogous provision in the Virginia Declaration 95 and,
consequently, the exclusive meaning of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.
96
Temporarily putting aside the validity of relying entirely upon these
historical circumstances, the Ingraham majority was faced with a glitch
of major proportions in pursuing this line of reasoning. The original
draft of the English Bill introduced in the House of Commons reads as
follows: "The requiring excessive bail of persons committed in criminal
cases and imposing excessive fines, and illegal punishments, to be
prevented., 97 The problem for the Justices was that the crucial phrase
"criminal cases" was deleted from the bill upon enactment.98
Under ordinary legal analysis-if not common sense-when language
of draft legislation is deleted from the ultimate enactment, this is taken
89. See infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
91. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-66.
92. Id. at 664.
93. Id. at 664-66.
94. Id. at 664-65.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 664-66.
97. Id. at 665 (citing Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 855 (1969)) (emphasis added).
98. Id.
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to signify that the deleted language no longer affects the enactment's
meaning. The Ingraham Court attempted to sidestep this difficulty,
observing that "the preservation of a similar reference in the preamble
indicates that the deletion was without substantive significance" 99 and
that Blackstone treated the provision "as bearing only on criminal
proceedings and judgments."'
The words of the preamble itself, as opposed to the Justices'
representation of them, tell a different story. The preamble's exact
words, in pertinent part, are:
WHEREAS the late King James the Second, by the assistance of divers
evil counsellors, judges, and ministers employed by him, did endeavor to
subvert and extirpate ... the laws and liberties of this kingdom.
10. And excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in
criminal cases, to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the
subjects.
11. And excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel
punishments inflicted.... 101
It should be noted that the much ballyhooed reference to "criminal
cases" appears in the preamble's clause 10 which solely addresses
excessive bail; the reference does not appear in the preamble's general
introductory language or in the preamble's clause 11 which solely
addresses "illegal and cruel punishments inflicted."' 0 2 To be blunt, the
Ingraham Justices' statutory construction of the English Bill of 1689's
preamble does not hold up.
Ingraham's strained construction is even further enfeebled owing to
the principle that a statutory preamble cannot create new substantive
law. 10 3 That was, nonetheless, what the Justices effectively did when
they manipulated the English Bill's preamble to create a limitation on
the Bill's body that is not actually there. While statutory preambles may
be consulted to infuse "the meaning or application of words otherwise
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *297, *379).
101. Id. at 665 n.33 (citing RICHARD L. PERRY & JOHN C. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES
245-46 (1959)).
102. Id.
103. See Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174, 188 (1889) (stating that a statutory
preamble "cannot enlarge or confer powers"); Leslie C. Kendrick, Comment, FDA 's Regulation of
Prescription Drug Labeling: A Role for Implied Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227, 235 n.63
(2007) (enunciating that statutory preambles "do not carry force of law"); cf Bernard W. Bell,
Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory
Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 44 n.155 (1999) (positing that statutory preambles have no binding
effect).
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obscure or doubtful,"' 104 the Justices never pretended that the words of
the English Bill's text, taken by themselves, were obscure or doubtful. 1
05
Furthermore, British jurists place even less emphasis on statutory
preambles than their American counterparts.'0 6 If the Ingraham majority
was trying to unearth what the English Bill meant to the English, the
Justices quite missed the proper interpretive route.
Ingraham likewise goes awry in summoning Blackstone to buttress
the contention that the English Bill's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments appertained to criminal proceedings and judgments
alone. 10 7 To back up this version of Blackstone's thinking, the Ingraham
case cites two pages of the Commentaries. 108 These pages are, however,
jarringly silent on the issue. 109 It is speculation, but perhaps the
Ingraham majority opinion was the victim of a typographical or other
clerical error rather than of a glaring substantive omission. Indeed,
elsewhere in the Commentaries there is a cryptic allusion to the
existence of the Bill's directive against cruel and unusual
punishments. 110 But, this is a reference made in passing, during a
discourse otherwise wholly dedicated to fines and forfeitures."' The
only thing that the reference says about the Bill's cruel and unusual
punishments clause is set forth in a parenthetical notation touching upon
the clause as having "had a retrospect to some unprecedented
proceedings in the court of king's bench, in the reign of [K]ing James
the second.' 12 Blackstone did not, at this or, it seems, at any other
juncture in the Commentaries, expand upon how the clause would apply
to fines, forfeitures, or other types of punishment.
113
104. Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923).
105. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 665.
106. Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 45, 91 (1994) (explaining that in England in 1792 preambles could not be construed to
restrict the plain words of a statute).
107. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 665.
108. Id. at 665 & n.34 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *297, *379).
109. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *297, *379.
110. Id. at *372.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. I scanned those chapters of the Commentaries which, by virtue of their headings,
appeared to be good candidates for locating a discourse on the English Bill's cruel and unusual
punishments clause, i.e., "Of the Nature of Crimes; And Their Punishment," "Of Commitment And
Bail," "Of Trial, And Conviction," "Of Judgment, And It's Consequences," "Of Execution," and "Of the
Rise, Progress And Gradual Improvements, of the Laws of England." Id. at *1, *293, *336, *368, *396,
*400. Except for the one page analyzed in the text above, these chapters did not deal with the clause. Id.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to fill in Ingraham's gaps. One such gap is the lack of
interpretation of Blackstone's parenthetical notation to which the Justices did not even cite. See supra
notes 107-12 and accompanying text. Out of curiosity, I have tried parsing the notation anyway, but still
1344
HeinOnline -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1344 2008-2009
2009] SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 1345
The paucity of the Justices' sources, detailed thus far, should, by
itself, be quite enough to shake Ingraham's historicist foundations
beyond repair. The unsettling fact is, though, that this is not an isolated
lapse. The Court, in gleaning original intent, was not sufficiently far-
reaching since its focus was solely on events preceding the English
Bill's enactment, to the exclusion of all other relevant historical
evidence. Concededly, the English Bill was a logical place for the
Justices to commence their originalist research inasmuch as the language
of clause 11 of the Bill's preamble, inveighing against cruel and unusual
punishments, was ultimately transposed, almost verbatim, into the
Eighth Amendment.114 Yet, a good departure point is not necessarily the
be-all and end-all, and here the Justices conflated the beginning with the
end. 115
found no anchor for the Justices' account.
In construing the Blackstone notation, as set forth in the quoted text above, his use of the
word "retrospect" invites some clarification for the contemporary reader. See BLACKSTONE, supra note
109, at *372. Webster's Dictionary gives an archaic definition of the noun "retrospect," hailing from
1602, as follows: "reference to or regard of a precedent or authority." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1008 (9th ed. 1989). So, it appears that Blackstone's notation merely tells us
that the English Bill's cruel and unusual punishments clause regards "some unprecedented proceedings
in the court of king's bench, in the reign of [K]ing James the second." BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at
*372.
Semantically, Blackstone's words do not assert that the clause must rein in only the King's
Bench during James II's rule. If the Ingraham Court had drawn such an inference from Blackstone's
parenthetical aside, the inference would have been a stretch. That the inference would have gone too far
is manifested by historical as well as linguistic analysis. While James II occupied the throne, the English
court system was decentralized. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure,
Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1202-03
(2005) (surveying some of the various courts that constituted the English legal system during the
seventeenth century); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 800-06 (2001) (writing about the different types of courts in
seventeenth century England). There were judges unattached to the King's Bench who tried criminal
cases and sentenced those found guilty. See Pushaw, Jr., supra, at 800-06 (asserting that the king had
judges throughout England, as well as commissioned sheriffs and justices of the peace, to dispose of
criminal cases, and indicating that these "jurists" were separate from the King's Bench); see also J.H.
BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 39 (4th ed. 2002) (pointing out that after 1421,
the "first-instance criminal jurisdiction" of the King's Bench was confined to Middlesex cases and those
cases removed by certiorari); CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, THE COMMON PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 43 (1987) (naming the various "formal outlets"
for prosecuting crimes during the seventeenth century in Sussex). It defies reasonable belief that
Blackstone, in twenty-one parenthesized words, would be making the strange proposition that the Bill's
cruel and unusual punishments clause governed the King's Bench but not other courts with jurisdiction
over criminal prosecutions. The improbability of Blackstone's having given the clause such a crabbed
reading is heightened by the fact that the text of the clause itself contains no caveats or qualifications
whatsoever. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
115. See Rumann, supra note 57, at 669-72 (descanting upon the existence of other available
evidence besides the English Bill concerning the probable original intent underlying the Eighth
Amendment, but accounting for the Justices' preoccupation with the English bill because its language is
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It appears that they could have expanded their research to beneficial
effect. The colonial intelligentsia had been well acquainted with the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments long before the English
Bill materialized.l16 The Reverend Nathaniel Ward introduced, into the
laws of Massachusetts colony, a provision quite similar to the Eighth
Amendment. 117 Ward's language is traceable to Englishman Sir Robert
Beale's writings which denounced the rack and other forms of physical
torture favored by his country's ecclesiastical court to extract
confessions from persons suspected but not yet convicted of offenses. 
18
It has been said "that the American Framers [clearly] read into [article
10 of the English Bill] the meaning of Beale and Ward.""l 9 The Beale-
Ward evidence of original intent thus yields a very different and entirely
plausible reading of the Eighth Amendment. This is evidence of an
intent to protect persons who have not yet been convicted, arguably
creating more latitude for extrapolation to endow public schoolchildren
with an Eighth Amendment right against physical punishment.
Finally, Ingraham's gossamer original intent argument becomes
virtually spectral when juxtaposed with the text of the Eighth
Amendment. That text is: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."' 12 There is no adjective "criminal" modifying "cruel and
unusual punishments." The Justices reasoned, though, that "[b]ail, fines,
and punishment traditionally have been associated with the criminal
process, and by subjecting the three to parallel limitations the text of the
Amendment suggests an intention to limit the power of those entrusted
with the criminal-law function of government."'
12 1
Surely the framers of the Eighth Amendment were capable of the kind
of drafting precision that would unmistakably ensure cabining
application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to criminal
sentences or, more broadly, to criminal litigation, if that was their intent.
One need only compare the Eighth Amendment with the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to see that this is so. 12 2 While the Eighth Amendment
almost the same as that in the Amendment).
116. Id. at 666-67.
117. Id. at 667-69.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 680 (quoting Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:"
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 860 (1969)).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. VIll.
121. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,664 (1977).
122. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that "[nlo person... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself... " U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The Sixth
Amendment declares, in part, that "'i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
1346
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contains no reference to "crime" or "criminal,, 123 the latter two
Amendments expressly use the words "crime" or "criminal
prosecutions" to delimit their scope. 124 None of this analysis is offered to
suggest that original intent may never override textualism, but in this
particular instance it is hard to fathom how an inconsistent original
intent can compete with the immovable testament of the written word.
There is an apparent disingenuousness about the Ingraham majority
opinion. How, after all, is one to rationalize the opinion's inclusion of
Fong Yue Ting and Uphaus in and omission of Trop and Estelle from the
stare decisis analysis, the inaccurate discussion of the English Bill's
preamble, an obliviousness toward the Ward-Beal evolution of the
language that is also in the Eighth Amendment, and the misattribution to
Blackstone of words he did not write? Perhaps the nicest thing one can
say is that when Ingraham was decided in 1977, its analysis was
inexplicably deficient in resting on distorted and fragmentary evidence
about precedent and the framers' intentions in drafting the Eighth
Amendment--evidence at odds with the provision's literal text. Those
problems with the decision have not, of course, been ameliorated over
the last thirty-one years.
3. Debunking the Rationale Relying on Fictional or Insignificant
Distinctions Between Schoolchildren and Prisoners
As the foregoing exegesis makes clear, the Ingraham Court found
itself in the awkward position of depriving public schoolchildren of the
Eighth Amendment while upholding its application to criminals. In
addition to invoking stare decisis and original intent, the Justices sought
to prop up this ethically dubious result with supposed distinctions
between the circumstances of public schoolchildren and of prisoners:
The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth
Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the public
school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very young, the
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added); see also Kristi J. Spiering, Comment,
Irrebuttable Exile Under the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: A Perspective from the Eighth
Amendment and International Human Rights Law, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1397, 1409-10 (1990) (averring
that "[c]onsiderable dissension exists" about whether the framers of the Eighth Amendment intended its
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to protect no one else besides criminals inasmuch as the framers
of other constitutional amendments explicitly confined them to criminal cases).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Lyndon F. Bittle, Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth
Amendment: An Analytical Framework for Determining Excessiveness, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1433, 1441
(1987) (remarking upon how the text of the Eighth Amendment does not warrant limiting its application
to criminal cases).
124. See supra note 122.
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child is not physically restrained from leaving school during school
hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is invariably free to
return home. Even while at school, the child brings with him the support
of family and friends and is rarely apart from teachers and other pupils
who may witness and protest any instances of mistreatment.
125
It is true that schoolchildren and prisoners are not identically situated;
it would be a peculiar world if they were. However, the Ingraham Court
selected distinctions between the two populations that either are
nonexistent or insignificant. For example, the Court would have us
believe that children may sometimes voluntarily attend school while
prisoners involuntarily go to jail. The difficulty with this comparison is
that each state has compulsory education laws covering children within
certain wide age ranges. 126 All states had compulsory education laws by
1918,127 fifty-nine years before Ingraham. The overwhelming majority
of American children of eligible age are enrolled pursuant to these laws
in public or private schools. 128 Since the advent of the early twentieth
125. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
126. ALA. CODE § 16-28-3 (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (2007); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-802 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201 (2007); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2007); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 22-33-104 (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-184 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2702
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 1003.21 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-690.1 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-
1132 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-202 (2007); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/26-1 (2007); IND. CODE
ANN. § 20-33-2-6 (2007); IOWA CODE § 299.1A (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (2006); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 159.010 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:221 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 5001-A (2007); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-301 (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.76, § 1
(2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 380.1561 (2007); MINN. STAT. § 120A.22(5) (2007); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 37-13-91(2)(f) (2007); Mo. REV. STAT. § 167.031 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (2007);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-201 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.040 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193:1
(2007); N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:38-25 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. § 22-12-2 (2007); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 3205 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-378 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-20-01 (2007);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.01 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 10-105 (2007); OR. REV.
STAT. § 339.010 (2008); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 13-1326 (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-19-1 (2007);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-65-10 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-27-1 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
3001 (2007); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25.085 (Vernon 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-1 1-101 (2007);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-254 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 28A.225.010 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 18-8-1 (2007); Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (2006); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-4-102 (2007).
127. See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in
Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 823 (1985).
128. According to the U.S. Department of Education's National Center for Education Statistics,
the total enrollment of students in the nation's public school system, from prekindergarten through the
12th grade, was 48,794,911 in the fall of 2004. NAT'L CTR FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., ENROLLMENT IN PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BY STATE OR JURISDICTION:
FALL 1990 THROUGH FALL 2006 tbl.33 (2006), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digestd06/tables/dt06_03
3.asp. That year is the most recent for which the Center has real enrollment statistics rather than
projected enrollment data. Id. The same source provides more dated statistics on enrollment of students
in the nation's private elementary and secondary schools; for fall 2003, the Center reports a total of
6,099,220 private school students in prekindergarten through the 12' grade. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
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century, there has been nothing in the least voluntary about children's
presence in school.
Another purported contrast upon which the Ingraham Court relied is
that, except for the "very young," children are not "physically
restrained" from leaving school premises during school hours while
prisoners are restrained from leaving prisons. 129 I do not know quite
what the Justices had in mind when they employed the phrase physically
restrained. Certainly schools do not contain cells or bars and prison
guards do not patrol the halls. However, compulsory education laws do
require that schoolchildren within specified age groups must be in
attendance at school during specified hours; thus, students must obtain
permission from school authorities in order to depart the premises.
1 30
In this connection, the Court added that when the school day ends,
children return to the family circle.131 But, how does that fact detract
from their situation as a captive audience while school is in session?
Children's inability during school hours to pick up and leave at their
whim is not undone by the exodus homeward later in the day. Whatever
distinctions exist, as between pupils and prisoners regarding mandatory
attendance, are insignificant in relation to the purposes for which the
Justices wished to use them.
The Ingraham Court also contrasted schools with prisons on the
assumption that public schools are "open institution[s]" and that the
child is hardly ever apart from teachers and other students who are in a
position to see and protest corporal mistreatment. 32 Prisoners, it is
implied, do not enjoy these amenities. In all candor, it borders on the
ludicrous to propose that children necessarily will be protected by being
in the vicinity of teachers inasmuch as it is often teachers who dispense
corporal punishment.' 33 And, it will be the rare child who, watching an
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PRIVATE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT,
TEACHERS, AND HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES, BY STATE: SELECTED YEARS, 1997 THROUGH 2003 tbl.59
(2006), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d06/tables/dtO6_O59.asp. Census 2000 reveals that, at that
time, 72.3 million people were under eighteen years of age in the United States-twenty-six percent of
the total population. CENSUS BRIEF, supra note 33.
129. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
130. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §6-17-112(a) (West 2007) (providing immunity from civil
liability for teachers and administrators who use corporal punishment); FLA. STAT. § 1003.32(1)(k)
(2007) (allowing school staff, including teachers, to use corporal punishment in keeping with respective
school board policies); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-730 (2007) (authorizing boards of education to adopt
policies on the use of corporal punishment by teachers and school principals); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 503.1 10(l)(a) (West 2007) (letting a teacher, or other person entrusted with the care of a minor, to use
physical force in order to promote the minor's welfare); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:223(A) (2007)
(endowing boards of education with discretion to adopt policies on use of corporal punishment by
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adult authority figure wielding a paddle, is likely to find the courage to
protest on behalf of his or her fellow. 134
The Court's only other proffered distinction between schoolchildren
and prisoners is that the child carries with him or her "the support of
family and friends," while adults are jailed without any such support.13 5
The Justices do not substantiate either assertion.136 The assumption that
all or most public schoolchildren are cushioned by such psychological
support is a rather romantic, Norman Rockwellian generalization about
the lives of American schoolchildren. 137 During the six-year period
(1981-1987) that I was Associate Counsel to the New York City Board
of Education, it was evident that large numbers of children saw their
schools as respites, sometimes grossly imperfect ones, from
dysfunctional, abusive, or neglectful families and the frequently anarchic
neighborhoods in which they resided. It is unlikely that anyone has ever
viewed imprisonment as a respite. But that is really neither here nor
there. What matters is that in both schools and prisons the emotional
support of family and friends is not always at hand; again, a distinction
that cannot be said to exist as a general rule.
The Court would have it that the schoolchild does not need the Eighth
Amendment as the prisoner does because "[t]he prisoner and the
schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances .... ,138 Where the
Justices went astray was in portraying the circumstances as "wholly"
divergent; it would be more accurate to state that the conditions in which
teachers and school principals); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(a)(3) (2007) (stipulating that only "a
teacher, substitute teacher, principal, or assistant principal may [dispense] corporal punishment"); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 844 (2007) (exempting teachers from a prohibition on employing ordinary physical force
as a means of discipline); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4103 (West 2007) (permitting teachers and school
principals to use corporal punishment).
134. Some experts opine that children who witness peers undergoing school corporal punishment
may experience adverse emotional reactions. See, e.g., IRWIN A. HYMAN, READING, WRITING AND THE
HICKORY STICK: THE APPALLING STORY OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS 78-80 (1990) [hereinafter HYMAN, HICKORY STICK] (theorizing that children who witness
school corporal punishment may internalize the experience which can later result in feelings of
loneliness and sadness).
Some jurisdictions do not allow a student to be corporally punished in the presence of other
schoolchildren. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § I1 5C-391(a)(1) (2007); see also Jerry R. Parkinson,
Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: Jurisprudence That Is Literally
Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REV. 276, 283 (1994) (noting that schoolchildren are often
removed from the classroom prior to receiving corporal punishment).
135. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
136. Id.
137. Other commentators have also taken a dim view of Ingraham's rosy assumptions about the
lives of schoolchildren. See, e.g., Parkinson, supra note 134, at 281-83 (criticizing the Ingraham
Justices for ignoring the realities of the school environment, including the reality that children will be
leery of protesting the paddling of another student).
138. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added).
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the two groups function feature some differences and some
commonalities. Then, the Court might have had a viable argument if the
differences it selected were real and consequential.
4. Debunking Other Rationales
The Ingraham Justices pronounced the Eighth Amendment a dead
letter vis-A-vis public schoolchildren predicated on considerations of
stare decisis, original intent, and alleged selected dissimilarities between
the situations of schoolchildren and prisoners. But, the Justices had still
another arrow in their quiver to assure the dead letter was beyond
resuscitation.
In deciding whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
extends to schoolchildren under threat of the rod, the Court opted to be
guided by "[t]raditional common-law concepts" and "attitude[s] which
our society has traditionally taken."'1 39 If these standards for ascertaining
the Clause's scope do not sound familiar, it is because they are not
familiar in aid of such a cause. The Ingraham majority provided as its
only authority for using them the plurality decision in Powell v.
Texas. 140 But, the Powell Court had employed these standards in an
extremely limited way that has no bearing on whether the Eighth
Amendment should or should not shield public schoolchildren from
corporal punishment.
The petitioner in Powell, an alcoholic, argued that his conviction for
public drunkenness ran afoul of the Amendment because Texas had
imposed criminal liability on him for an involuntary condition entailing
no mens rea.141 The lead opinion rejects this contention by, in part,
referring to traditional common law concepts of personal
accountability. 142 Reference to these concepts led the Justices to
conclude that assigning criminal responsibility for being drunk in public
rightly falls within such a tradition and therefore outside the
proscriptions of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 143 Boiled
down, Powell deployed traditional common law concepts on the theory
that, if Texas's assignment of criminal liability came within those
concepts, the conviction could not violate the Clause. 144 In comparison,
139. Id. at 659 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531, 535 (1968) (plurality decision))
(alteration in original).
140. See 392 U.S. 514, 531, 533, 535 (1968) (plurality opinion).
141. Id. at 517,530, 532,535.
142. Id. at 535-36.
143. Id. at 535-37.
144. Id.
2009] 1351
HeinOnline -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1351 2008-2009
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LA W REVIEW [Vol.77
the Ingraham Court marshaled traditional common law concepts
towards a completely different end, i.e., toward resolving the threshold
issue of whether the Clause applies at all to corporal punishment in the
public schools. 145 In Ingraham, the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment was the issue, not how it applied.146 The Ingraham majority
never reached the question of whether public school paddlings actually
violate the Amendment.1
47
Ingraham's mention of"attitude[s] which our society has traditionally
taken" is similarly incongruous here. 148 Powell averred that American
society had a longstanding "harsh moral attitude" about intoxication and
that criminal conviction for public intoxication was a reflection of that
norm. 149 The Powell discussion does not address whether an Eighth
Amendment cause of action could be stated against this type of
conviction, 150 rendering the decision irrelevant to the issue presented in
the schoolchildren's case of whether an Eighth Amendment cause of
action could be stated against disciplinary paddling.
5. Summation
The rationales underpinning the Ingraham decision do not withstand
close scrutiny. Every one of them was and still is bankrupt. In fact, the
majority opinion is remarkable for its rare display of judicial casualness.
It is hard to understand why any Justice would ever treat a constitutional
issue cavalierly, let alone one involving children's physical integrity.
There is an enigma here that is perhaps better left shrouded in the mists
of 1977. That Ingraham was not the high Court's finest hour, however,
is crystal clear. For the sake of Eighth Amendment doctrine and the
Court's repute, if not to promote a less bruising pedagogy, the Justices
should overturn the decision at the very first opportunity.
145. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1977).
146. Id. at 659-71.
147. Id. at 659-83.
148. Id. at 659 (quoting Powell, 392 U.S. at 531) (alteration in original).
149. Powell, 392 U.S. 514, 531 (1968) (plurality opinion).
150. Id. at 517-37.
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IV. PUBLIC SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AS A VIOLATION OF THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A. An Introductory Overview of Relevant General Analytical Principles
Under the Amendment
That Ingraham constitutes a poverty of precedent on its own terms
suggests its days should be numbered. In the event that the Court
invalidates Ingraham in the next appropriate case, the question will
necessarily arise as to whether corporal punishment of children in public
elementary and secondary schools does in fact violate the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. This Article now
broaches that unexplored question.
By way of preview, the argument will be advanced herein that the
Court's most recent Eighth Amendment decisions require an answer in
the affirmative. 151 As a tangential matter, however, observe that these
decisions may also have set in motion a process of subtly eroding
Ingraham's social acceptability. That is, if public school corporal
punishment cannot survive application of the Court's recently articulated
Eighth Amendment standards, then the outcome in Ingraham should
seem increasingly heterodox and problematic from a policy perspective.
Until its most recent Eighth Amendment decision, Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 152 the Court sometimes has invoked as an initial
consideration whether a challenged punishment would have violated the
Amendment when the latter was adopted in 1791.153 A punishment that
would have infringed the Amendment in 1791 was deemed
automatically unconstitutional; 154 a punishment that would have been
151. See infra notes 462-64 and accompanying test.
152. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), reh 'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008). In 2008, the Supreme Court also
rendered another Eighth Amendment decision concerning the manner of implementing executions. See
Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). However, the latter is not germane to this Article.
153. Tracy E. Robinson, Comment, By Popular Demand? The Supreme Court's Use of Public
Opinion Polls in Atkins v. Virginia, 14 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 107, 109-10 (2004); see Jeffrey
D. Bukowski, Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Original Intent: Applying the Prohibition Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases Is Not Beyond the Bounds of History and
Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 423 (1995) (remarking that, after the initial phase of the Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not restricted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause to proscribing only those punishments that had been outlawed in the 18th century); cf Brian W.
Varland, Marking the Progress of a Maturing Society: Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Death
Penalty Application in Light of Evolving Standards of Decency, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 311, 314-16
(2005) (detailing the historicist criterion's use as the sole test of constitutionality in the earliest cases
under the Eighth Amendment).
154. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (observing that a test of
constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment remains the determination of whether a challenged
punishment "had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted");
Robinson, supra note 153, at 110 (declaring that the Court has not abandoned the "historical
2009] 1353
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valid under the Amendment in 1791, required further analysis under
other relevant criteria. 155  In some cases, the Court skipped this
preliminary consideration altogether, presumably when it was patent that
the punishment would not have offended the sensibilities of the early
republic. 156 However, in its 2008 decision of Kennedy v. Louisiana, the
Court expressed a pronounced disinterest, doctrinally speaking, in
pursuing such a line of investigation. 157 The Court did not state, though,
that it was forever foreclosing an inquiry of this ilk either. 158 It is quite
possible, therefore, that the historical criterion (hereinafter the historical
or first criterion) may be revived in future decisions.
The second criterion entails the application of two interrelated
interpretive principles which have infused the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause with continuing life, enabling it to function as more
than ink on vellum under glass. The second criterion requires that the
Clause must be construed by reference to evolving standards of decency
inhering in a mature society 159  and to updated public opinion
enlightened by a humane justice (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"standards of decency").' 16 To follow this principle of construction, the
Court consults sources outside of the Constitution itself, searching for
objective evidence of modem standards of decency 16 1 in states' laws; 162
sometimes in other expressions of domestic public opinion;'
63
component" of analysis under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
155. See infra notes 159-73 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556-78 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
306-21 (2002).
157. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), reh 'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
158. Id. at 2645-65.
159. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion); accord Roper, 543 U.S. at 560-
61; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
160. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910); accord McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 300 (1987); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (plurality opinion).
161. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312, 314-15; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 788-89 (1982) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REv. 615,623 (2000).
162. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-67; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-16; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-93;
Coker, 433 U.S. at 592-96; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle
Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National
Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2006).
163. E.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (taking into account, under the Eighth Amendment,
positions of professional organizations and religious communities as well as polling data concerning
national lay opinion); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300 (remarking upon the existence of Eighth Amendment
precedent for referring to the "sentencing decisions of juries"); Robinson, supra note 153, at 110-1I
(averring that since 1910 the Court has been willing to consider "public attitudes" in adjudicating Eighth
Amendment claims).
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sometimes in international human rights law or international opinion;'
64
and sometimes in the laws of other countries. 165 The Court commonly
groups state law and other expressions of domestic opinion under the
rubric of "national consensus," meaning an American consensus.' 
66
Regardless of the outcome under modem standards of decency, there
is still a third criterion to be satisfied. The Court must also bring to bear
its own subjective, independent judgment about whether a punishment
flouts the Clause. 167 Fulfilling this responsibility has essentially involved
the Court in assessing the proportionality of a given punishment in
relation to the crime being punished. 168 For instance, in death penalty
cases, the Justices have deciphered proportionality as an amalgam of
such factors as whether the punishment serves penological or social
purposes, 169  whether the convict is of diminished culpability or
capacity, 170  and whether the circumstances are liable to result in
wrongful execution. 171 The contemporary Court has repeatedly made
bona fide analytical efforts to form an opinion about the cruelty of each
litigated punishment, quite separate from any extant national or
international consensus on the matter.' 72 Whether or not such a feat of
164. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788, 796
n.22; Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10; Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03; Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay
Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL
L. REV. 147, 204-05 (1998); A. Mark Weisburd, Roper and the Use of International Sources, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. 789, 795-98 (2005).
165. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 577-78 (examining the laws and practices of all nations, with
emphasis on laws of the United Kingdom); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (attending to the policies of
"leading members of the Western European community" (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830, 831 n.31 (1988))); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 796 n.22 (canvassing the laws of England, India,
Canada and other Commonwealth countries as well as the laws of continental European nations); Coker,
433 U.S. at 596 n. 10 (surveying the laws of sixty countries); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson
Zindahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the
Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 891-92 (2005).
166. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64.
167. E.g., id. at 564, 568-75; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13, 318-21; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801;
Coker, 433 U.S. at 597; Kenneth W. Starr, The Court of Pragmatism and Internationalization: A
Response to Professors Chemerinsky andAmann, 94 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1571 & n.33, 1572 (2006).
168. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2658-65 (2008), reh"g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1
(2008); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-75; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13, 318-21; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-801.
169. See, e.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661-62; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-
19; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
170. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-71; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20.
171. See, e.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2663; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
172. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-75 (enumerating the characteristics of juveniles which
make them, as a class, persons of diminished culpability and at increased risk of wrongful execution);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13, 318-21 (identifying the traits of mentally retarded offenders which cause
them to be of diminished capacity and in peril of wrongful execution); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-801
(stating that a defendant, who did not kill or intend to kill, does not deserve the death penalty).
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mental compartmentalization is really possible, 173 the Court seems to
have been bound and determined to try.
B. Exposition and Application of Detailed Eighth Amendment Analysis
to Public School Corporal Punishment
1. Exposition and Application of the First Analytical Criterion to Public
School Corporal Punishment
There appears to be no evidence that the framers of the Eighth
Amendment had punishments of schoolchildren in mind when drafting
its prohibitions. Certainly the Ingraham Court did not allude to the
existence of such evidence. 174 This Article therefore will proceed upon a
conservative supposition that governmental punishments of
schoolchildren would not have contravened the Eighth Amendment in
1791. Hence, under the first criterion, school corporal punishment
should be yet in good standing under the Amendment.
2. Exposition of the Second and Third Analytical Criteria as Interpreted
in the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy Trilogy
Atkins v. Virginia,175 Roper v. Simmons,1 76 and Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 177 the most recent pertinent death penalty cases, represent the
fullness of the Court's thinking to date on the contours of the second and
third criteria. However, before analyzing this trilogy and how school
corporal punishment might fare under its Eighth Amendment standards,
a threshold issue fairly leaps off the page; this issue concerns whether,
rather than how, these standards can apply to school paddling in the first
place. In other words, are the death penalty and corporal punishment of
children so profoundly different from each other that the trilogy should
have no bearing on the constitutional status of the latter?
Punishment is punishment, whether it is a paddling in the public
schools or a judicially ordered execution; both are meted out in response
to wrongdoing; both are dispensed by governmental actors; and both are
forms of legalized physical assault upon the wrongdoers.
But, these punishments are vastly different in other respects. School
173. Cf Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (commenting,
in a discussion about the standard of review ofjury findings in a race discrimination suit, that "there are
limits to the fineness of the distinctions that judges are able to make").
174. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653-71 (1977).
175. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
176. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
177. 128 S. Ct. 2641,2658-65 (2008), reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
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corporal punishment is an attack on bodily integrity which may result in
injury and only very, very rarely in death; to state the tautological, the
death penalty is an attack on bodily integrity that always causes death.
School corporal punishment is, by definition, always visited upon
children; executions, as a constitutional matter, can only be carried out
upon adults. 178 School corporal punishment is usually administered in
response to misbehavior which does not violate criminal laws; capital
punishment is reserved solely for those convicted of heinous felonies
involving the taking of or intention to take an individual human life.
1 79
The shared features of school corporal punishment and the death
penalty logically point toward the conclusion that the former should be
evaluated under the Eighth Amendment standards governing the latter.
Two of the dissimilarities also logically point in that direction. The fact
that children are generally more vulnerable, immature, and dependent
than adults would seem to make them at least as needful of
constitutional protection from bodily punishment as adults. And, the fact
that the average child's misconduct is far more benign than the worst
adult felonies would seem to make children in school more deserving of
such protection.
Thus, the only aspect of these two punishments that arguably counsels
divergent treatment under the Amendment is that school corporal
punishment almost never results in death while capital punishment
uniformly does. This distinction, extreme as it is, ultimately has no real
significance for purposes of gauging the Amendment's applicability to
corporal punishment of children. The Court has on occasion held that
bodily punishments falling well short of death may contravene the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause. 180 Indeed, the Court has also held that
certain nonviolent 2punishments18 1 and various deleterious but nonfatal
prison conditions 18 violate the Clause. Making allowance for doctrinal
178. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
179. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650-51, 2659, 2664-65.
180. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738-39 (2002) (ruling that security guards'
handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post and denying him adequate hydration and bathroom breaks
while he was shackled for an extended period of time under a hot sun violated the Eighth Amendment).
Although the Hope Court characterized the litigated conduct as part of prison conditions, the Court also
described that conduct as punishment. Id. at 737-38; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
362-63, 380-81 (1910) (deciding that a sentence of a fine and fifteen years imprisonment, during which
time the convict was forced to wear chains and engage in hard labor, violates the Eighth Amendment
when metedout to punish an official's falsification of a public document).
181. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-103 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding that
congressionally authorized termination of an individual's American citizenship, after he has been court
martialed, constitutes an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment even though the judiciary was
not involved in deciding upon the termination).
182. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (establishing that prison guards' use of
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refinements over time' 8 3 and certain exceptions not germane here,' 84 the
Court has applied the same basic constitutional standards in these cases
as in death penalty challenges.' 85 There consequently is no discemable
reason, based on logic or precedent, to exempt school corporal
punishment from the trilogy's criteria.
a. Atkins
Atkins required the Court to pass upon whether the Eighth
Amendment had become the undoing of the death penalty when used on
mentally retarded persons convicted of capital crimes.' 86  Without
stopping to explore the state of affairs in 1791, the Atkins Court plunged
into identifying whether modem standards of decency tolerated the
excessive physical force on an inmate may violate the Eighth Amendment even though he does not
suffer serious injury therefrom); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-05 (1976) (ruling that prison
employees' deliberate indifference to a prisoner's need for medical care may run afoul of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-87 (1978) (holding that it
contravened the Eighth Amendment for inmates to suffer the combination of poor diets, overcrowding,
rampant violence, vandalized cells, extended time in the isolation cells, and lack of good judgment by
security personnel).
183. For example, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, the Court had not yet formally conceived that
Eighth Amendment analysis should turn, not only upon objective indicia of standards of decency, but
also upon the Court's separate independent judgment. The latter analytical phase has become an integral
component of cases under the Amendment. See, e.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2650-51; Roper, 543 U.S.
at 564; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
184. In some Eighth Amendment actions, the outcome pivots solely on whether a person's acts
and/or circumstances can be criminalized and punished. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962) (holding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is not consistent with criminalizing
and penalizing a person's narcotics addiction). Some cases under the Amendment have focused
exclusively on whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime perpetrated.
See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 290, 303 (1983), superseded by statute, Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2011, as recognized in, In re Lauer, 788 F.2d
135, 137 n.2 (8th Cir. Jud. Council 1985) (deciding that a life sentence without possibility of parole is
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment because it is not proportional to the perpetrator's commission of a
seventh nonviolent felony).
185. Compare Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-05 (1976) (using standards of decency,
manifested in states' legislation, and the criterion of dignity in order to assess whether a prisoner stated a
cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for prison authorities' deliberate indifference to his
medical needs), and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-47, 352 (1981) (applying standards of
decency, including as evidenced in states' legislation, and bringing to bear the Court's own independent
judgment for purposes of determining whether double ceiling violates the Eighth Amendment), with
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649-51 (utilizing standards of decency, evinced in states' laws, and bringing to
bear the Court's own independent judgment in adjudging whether the death penalty is constitutional
under the Eighth Amendment when meted out for raping a child), and Roper, 543 U.S. at 560, 564
(relying upon standards of decency, as manifested via states' legislation and other sources; upon the
requirement of dignity; and upon the Court's independent judgment in order to adjudicate whether the
juvenile death penalty offends the Eighth Amendment).
186. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-07.
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penalty for this cohort. 8 7 In trying to determine whether an American
national consensus existed on this issue and, if so, what it was, the Court
did the sensible thing: it counted heads.
1 88
Atkins regarded state enactments as the "most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values" manifesting standards of decency.189
According to the Justices' data, a total of thirty-two states had prohibited
the death penalty for the mentally retarded when Atkins was before the
Court. 190
The Atkins Court's next computation was directed at determining the
"consistency of the direction of change" in state legislation on the
topic, 19 1 a computation that, in turn, was contingent upon the data giving
rise to the rate of change. The Court stated that this factor was even
more significant than the number of states rejecting the death penalty for
mentally retarded felons. 192 The Court found that there was a 100%
"absence of States passing legislation reinstating ... such
executions." 1
9 3
The Justices arrived at this conclusion by what may be distilled to a
five-step process, 194 a process which would be used in subsequent cases,
though with variations in either the sequence or the discreteness of the
steps, or in both. 195 First, they set a time period evidently deemed
relevant to discovering the direction of legislative change on capital
punishment of the mentally retarded.196 Atkins demarcated that period as
starting in 1989,197 the year in which the Court had last addressed the
constitutionality of such punishment in Penry v. Lynaugh.198 (Penry had
upheld execution of mentally retarded criminals under the Eighth
Amendment. 199) The period ended in 2002, the year that the Court heard
and decided Atkins. 200 Second, the Atkins Justices ascertained that as of
1989, sixteen states had outlawed the death penalty for the mentally
187. Id. at 311-17.
188. Id. at 313-15, 316 & n.21, 317 (reciting the state laws, state practices, professional
organizations, religious representatives, and polling data against the death penalty for mentally retarded
perpetrators).
189. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
190. Id. at313-14.
191. Id. at315-16.
192. Id. at 315.
193. Id. at 315-16.
194. Id. at310,313-16.
195. See infra notes 234-45 and accompanying text.
196. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310, 313-16.
197. Id. at 310, 314.
198. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (plurality opinion).
199. Id. at340.
200. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 & n.17.
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retarded (consisting of two states that had barred execution of the
mentally retarded in particular and fourteen states that had eliminated
the death penalty entirely). 20 1 Third, the Court took into account that a
total of thirty-two states had prohibited the death penalty for the
mentally retarded by 2002.202 Fourth, simple subtraction yielded the
result that during a thirteen-year period, sixteen states had adopted de
jure policies forbidding execution of this cohort.2 0 3 Fifth, the Court
reported that during the same time span no states had legislated in the
opposite direction. 20 4 Hence, Atkins laid the basis for finding, and then
found, an unbroken consistency among the state legislatures that had
addressed the issue since the Court's last decision on the punishment's
constitutionality.2 5
In gauging the trend among state governments, the Court also
investigated the de facto situation in those jurisdictions where executing
mentally retarded convicts was still legislatively permissible.20 6 The
Court determined that the practice had become "truly unusual," which
the Justices mused, could coincidentally explain these states' inertia vis-
Ai-vis initiating abolitionary legislative reform.
20 7
Beyond its census of state governments, the Court did a head-count of
other expressions of societal and professional opposition to the death
penalty as a criminal sentence for this cohort. 20 8 For example, the Court
consulted polling data which disclosed "widespread consensus among
Americans" that putting mentally retarded convicts to death is wrong.
20 9
The Court further remarked that representatives of some religious
communities in the United States had filed an amicus curiae brief
expressing the same bias.2 10 Additionally, the Court found a telling
barometer of professional opinion in that "several organizations with
germane expertise have adopted official positions" against the death
penalty in this context.21'
On the basis of this wide-ranging survey, the Atkins Court ruled that
201. Id. at 313-14.
202. Seeid. at313-15.
203. Id. at 313-15.
204. Id. at 315-16.
205. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
206. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
207. Id.
208. Id. at316&n.21.
209. Id.
210. Id. Representatives of the Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and Buddhist faiths filed the amicus
curia brief Id.
211. Id. The Court named the American Psychological Association as one of the organizations
that had adopted an official position against sentencing mentally retarded criminals to death. Id.
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the requisite American consensus against the punishment existed.212
However, before concluding whether modem standards of decency
rejected such punishment, the Court inquired into the attitudes of those
beyond U.S. borders, 213 and summarized the international view as
"overwhelming" disapproval of such sentencing. 214 Thus, after all of the
objective evidence, nationally and internationally, was said and counted,
the Atkins Court decided that modem standards of decency were
incompatible with imposition of the death penalty on the mentally
retarded.215
This left the Court to tackle the third criterion of Eighth Amendment
analysis. The Justices elaborated that, in cases where it has been
concluded that the challenged punishment is contrary to modem
standards of decency, the Court must additionally bring its own
judgment to bear by asking "whether there is reason to disagree with the
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators."2 16 Without
explicitly mentioning that proportionality was informing its judgment,
the Court recognizably used that concept in questioning whether the
punishment's penological or social purposes would be served by
executing a mentally retarded convict.217 The Court iterated that in prior
decisions it had identified the purposes of the punishment as retribution
for the crime committed and deterrence of other potential offenders.
218
For a variety of reasons not relevant here, the Court determined that if
the death penalty was imposed on mentally retarded perpetrators of
capital crimes, it would serve neither purpose21 9 and therefore would be
pointless and unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering, 220 i.e.,
disproportional. The Court also threw into the mix that the mentally
retarded are susceptible to wrongful execution because of their inherent
deficiencies in proving mitigation, assisting defense counsel, impressing
the trier of fact, or all three.221 On the basis of these considerations, the
Justices gave their independent assessment that imposing the death
penalty on the mentally retarded inevitably collides with Eighth
212. Id. at 316-17.
213. Id. at 316 n.21.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 316 & n.21,317.
216. Id. at 313.
217. Id. at318-20.
218. Id. at 318-19 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (Stewart, Powell &
Stevens, J.J.)).
219. Id. at319-20.
220. Id.
221. Id. at320-21.
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Amendment tenets.222 Because of this assessment and the American and
foreign consensus, the Court held that sentencing mentally retarded
felons to death violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.223
b. Roper
The second instructive case of the trilogy is Roper v. Simmons 224 in
which the Court held that sentencing felons to death for capital crimes
committed when they were juveniles (hereinafter "juvenile death
penalty") violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause as well.225
The Court's analytical approach paralleled the criteria and progression it
had employed in Atkins.226 As in Atkins, the Court skipped the first
criterion without explanation, 227 promptly launching instead into a quest
for objective indicia of modem standards of decency by examining state
legislation.228 The Roper majority reported that, as of 2004, the year in
which the case was argued before the Justices, 229 a total of thirty states
prohibited the juvenile death penalty (comprised of twelve states that
had abolished the death penalty for everyone and eighteen states that had
only eradicated it for persons under eighteen years old).23' The Court
compared this figure to the total of abolitionist states in Atkins, which
the Roper opinion misstates to be thirty instead of thirty-two. 231 The
error is insignificant, though, because the Court in each case found thirty
states, all subscribing to the same legislative choice, to constitute a
sufficient indicator of national consensus. 232 Indeed, Roper asserts: "[a]
majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on
juvenile offenders under 18, and we now hold this is required by the
Eighth Amendment., 233 The assertion carries an irresistible implication
that twenty-six states could have sufficed just as well.
The Roper Court conceded, however, that the rate of change in
222. Id. at319-21.
223. Id. at 321.
224. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
225. Id. at 578.
226. Id. at 564-78.
227. Id. at 555-79.
228. Id. at 564-67.
229. Id. at 551.
230. Id. at 564.
231. Id. The Atkins Court's actual enumeration of abolitionist states, as of the pertinent end date,
is clearly set forth in the majority opinion, although the majority never itself bothered to do the addition.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002). However, the addition of all states on Atkins'
abolitionist list comes to thirty-two. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
232. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68;Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-17, 321.
233. Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (emphasis added).
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reducing the incidence of the juvenile death penalty or in taking legal
steps to eliminate it had been slower than the analogous rate of change
involved in Atkins.234 To compute the rate of change and its consistency,
the Roper Justices used the five-step process from Atkins.235 First, Roper
establishes a relevant time period.236 The start date is 1989,237 the year in
which the Court had last confronted the same issue, in Stanford v.
Kentucky.238 (Stanford held that the Eighth Amendment does not
preclude execution of juveniles over fifteen years of age.239) The end
date is 2004, when Roper was argued before the Court, thereby making
the time period fifteen years long.240 Reversing the order of the second
and fourth steps,241 the Court next reported that five states had
prohibited the juvenile death penalty during the fifteen-year time
span.242 Third, the Justices recalled their prior finding that, as of the
2004 end date, thirty states had interdicted the juvenile death penalty. 243
The "new" fourth step, had the Court expressly laid it out, would have
consisted of subtracting five from thirty, yielding the statistic that, at the
start of the period, twenty-five states had adopted de jure bans on
executing minors-a statistic that the Court must also have employed to
obtain a grand total of thirty. 244 Fifth, the Court remarked that there was
no evidence that, during the fifteen years, any states had legislated to
authorize or re-authorize the juvenile death penalty.245
The Roper Justices expressed some misgivings over the fact that only
five states had abolished the juvenile death penalty within fifteen years
while under Atkins sixteen states had eradicated the death penalty for the
mentally retarded over a thirteen year period.246 Nevertheless, the Roper
majority judged that the slower rate of change was still "significant., 247
In any event, Roper followed Atkins in giving the most weight, in
tallying state laws, to the "consistency of the direction of change"
234. Id. at 565.
235. See supra notes 194-205 and accompanying text.
236. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
237. Id.
238. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
239. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
240. Roper, 543 U.S. at 551, 565.
241. See infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
242. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565.
243. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
244. The computation in the text above is my own.
245. Roper, 543 U.S. at 565-66.
246. Id. at 565.
247. Id.
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which, as in Atkins, was 100% against the challenged punishment. 248
This unbroken trajectory was accentuated by enactment of the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994 in which Congress also forbade
administration of the death penalty to juveniles.249
Further adhering to the Atkins analytical template, the Roper Justices
took stock of state practice in those jurisdictions where the juvenile
death penalty was still legal.250 They concluded that even in these states,
the instances of juvenile execution were "infrequent." 251 "[T]he rejection
of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of
its use even where it remains on the books; and the consistency in the
trend toward abolition of the practice" led the Roper Court to find an
American consensus against the penalty. 252 Due to the evolution of state
law and practice, the Court intimated that the constitutionality of the
punishment under the Amendment was on shaky ground. 3
The Court then reconnoitered on the international front, discovering
in the process an almost universal clamor against the penalty. 254 The
Justices found that the United States was the only nation in the world
that continued to permit the juvenile death penalty;255 that the juvenile
death penalty was interdicted by several international human rights
treaties such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child;256 and, that only seven countries other than the
United States had put juvenile perpetrators to death since 1990, and each
of these seven subsequently either eliminated or publicly disavowed the
248. Id. at 565-66 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002)).
249. Id. at 567.
250. Id. at 564-65.
251. Id. at 564.
252. Id. at 567. It should be noted that the petitioner in Roper argued that the national consensus
against the juvenile death penalty had been broken by the United States reservation to article 6(5) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Id. That treaty provision prohibits capital
punishment of minors. Id. The Roper Court rebuffed petitioner's argument for two reasons. First, the
reservation was adopted in 1992, and, since then, five states (American) had abolished the juvenile death
penalty. Second, by enacting the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, Congress enunciated its
disapproval of the juvenile death penalty. Id.
253. Id. at 568.
254. Id. at 575-78.
255. Id. at 575.
256. Id. at 576. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.V. Doc. A/44/49; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
OAU Doc. CAB, LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered inforce Nov. 29, 1999.
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juvenile death penalty.257 The Court considered the status of the penalty
in the United Kingdom to be particularly material because of the historic
link between that country and the United States and because of the
purported origins of the Eighth Amendment in the English Bill of Rights
of 1689.258 By the time Roper was decided in 2005, the United Kingdom
had completely abolished the death penalty; this had been preceded five
and a half decades earlier by abolition of the juvenile death penalty in
particular. 259 The Roper Court therefore deduced that an international
consensus against executing juveniles was firmly in place.260
Finally, addressing the third criterion, the Court brought to bear its
own independent judgment on whether the juvenile death penalty was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. That is, the Court
considered whether the penalty could not serve the purposes of
retribution for the crime committed or deterrence of other potential
criminals and therefore was not proportional to a capital crime
committed by this order of offender.261 After painstakingly examining
the qualitative psychological differences between juveniles under
eighteen years of age and adults which, relatively speaking, shows the
former to have "diminished culpability, '' 262 the Roper Court concluded
that the juvenile death penalty serves neither purpose.2 63 Having
articulated its agreement with the broad consensus condemning this
punishment, the majority held the penalty, as applied to this cohort, to be
a violation of the Amendment. 264
c. Kennedy
In Kennedy v. Louisiana,265 the third case of the trilogy, the Court was
faced with judging whether the Eighth Amendment should abrogate the
death penalty for an individual convicted of raping, but not killing or
intending to kill, a child (hereinafter "child rape" or "rape of a child"). 266
After declaring its disinterest in the penalty's constitutional posture as of
1791,267 the Court straightaway took up application of the second
257. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577.
258. Id. at 577-78.
259. Id. at 577.
260. Id. at 578.
261. Id. at 564, 568-75.
262. Id. at 568-73.
263. Id. at 572.
264. Id. at 575, 578-79.
265. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
266. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51.
267. Id. at 2649.
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criterion under the Amendment, i.e., whether contemporary standards of
decency still embraced execution of such a perpetrator.268
The Court searched for objective indicia of homegrown standards by
examining state law on the topic.269 Still cleaving tightly to the
methodology of Atkins and Roper, the Kennedy Justices counted heads
as of 2008, the year they heard the case. 270 They determined that out of
the thirty-six states (plus the federal government) which retained the
death penalty, a subset of only six states had the penalty for raping a
child;27 1  or, conversely, forty-five jurisdictions simultaneously
disallowed it. The Court noted that the latter figure-the total of
abolitionist states-surpassed the end-date grand totals of abolitionist
states in Atkins and Roper, respectively. 272 In any event, the Kennedy
Court opined that the forty-five abolitionist jurisdictions were significant
evidence of societal standards of decency condemning capital
punishment of child rapists. 273
Kennedy also took into account, as precedent dictated, the rate of
change and its consistency against the penalty for such felons, and in a
general way relied upon the five-step process to do so. 274 However,
Kennedy diverges from Atkins and Roper in implementation of the first
step. The Court used two different time periods, instead of one, to make
these calculations, with no explanation as to why two were called for or
why any of their start and end dates were selected. 275 The Court began
by using "the last 13 years,"276 the same time period used in Atkins.277
The Kennedy Justices then made step two of their analysis the tabulation
of states authorizing execution for child rape within that period. They
found that during this interval, "there ha[d] been change towards making
child rape a capital offense. 27 8 The Court detected no trend repudiating
execution for this crime in the fact that the allotted period also saw six
new death penalty statutes (applicable to child rapists) enacted,
268. Id. at 2658.
269. Id. at 2650-56. The Kennedy Court traced pertinent legislative history as far back as 1925.
Id. at 2651. Although the majority opinion subsequently refers to this history as part of the search for a
national consensus on the propriety of executing child rapists, it is not clear how the early history
informed that search other than as a starting point. Id. at 2651-56.
270. Id. at 2650-53.
271. Id. at2653.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 2654-57.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 2656.
277. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
278. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2656.
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including three within the two years immediately preceding Kennedy,279
and the appearance of no statutes going the other way. This absence of a
repudiating trend, said the Court, was confirmed by contrasting the
situation with the relevant Atkins benchmark; Kennedy recalled Atkins as
detecting a trend against execution of the mentally retarded on the basis
that between 1986 and 2001280 eighteen states had enacted laws
forbidding the challenged punishment while no states did
281contrariwise.
The alternative time period utilized in Kennedy runs from 1972,282
when Furman v. Georgia2 83 was decided. (In Furman, the Court had
issued a per curiam opinion striking down, under the Eighth
Amendment, the death sentences lower courts had pronounced in two
rape cases and one murder case.284) Advancing to the second step under
this timetable, the Kennedy Court reported that since Furman, six states
had classified child rape as a capital offense, and opined that "[t]his is
not an indication of a trend or change in direction comparable to the one
supported by data in Roper."285 So, Roper, in effect, functioned as
Kennedy's benchmark within the context of the second alternative time
period. Kennedy editorializes that, although the pace of legislative
abolition presented in Roper was not as great as in Atkins, Roper's
deficiency was "counterbalanced" by the sheer number of states
rejecting the juvenile death penalty, including especially the twenty-
seven states which had by 1989 banned executions of those juveniles
between sixteen and eighteen years of age. 286 Because the Kennedy
Court already had ascertained that, as of 2008, a total of only six states
had statutes authorizing capital punishment for child rape (the same
calculation as in the third step),287 the Court intimated that the
279. Id.
280. Id. The above-referenced portion of the Kennedy majority opinion is somewhat confusing.
The time period actually used in Atkins to compute the rate of change was thirteen years long. See Roper
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (describing Atkins as counting forward from Penry and thereby
creating a thirteen-year time period); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307-15 (2002) (counting forward
from the 1989 decision of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). Yet, Kennedy describes the data
from Atkins as covering the fifteen-year time span between 1986 and 2001. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2656.
While it is true that Atkins mentions some relevant events between 1986 and 1989, they do not consist of
state enactments which are the key to the Atkins analysis. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16.
281. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2656.
282. Id.
283. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam opinion).
284. Id. at 239-40.
285. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657.
286. Id.
287. See supra notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
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consistency of the rate of change was not counterbalanced as it had been
in Roper. 
288
The Kennedy Justices had no need to go further in their analysis of
state legislation since the statistics produced by the second and third
analytical steps could not hold a candle to the Atkins and Roper statistics
indicative of a national consensus against the punishments litigated in
those two cases. In the end, however, Kennedy's shortfall became a
moot point because the Justices instead recurred to Enmund v.
Florida,289 which offered yet another and more generous benchmark by
which to measure consistency of the rate of change. In Enmund, the
Court had discerned a sufficient consistency of rate of change against
capital punishment for vicarious felony murder even though eight
jurisdictions had authorized the punishment.290 The Kennedy Court ruled
that, because its data closely resembled the data adduced in Enmund,
there was enough legislative reform to demonstrate a national consensus
repugnant toward executing child rapists.
291
The Court's search for that consensus also prompted it to survey state
practices with respect to executing child rapists. 292 Statistics showed that
no one had been put to death for raping an adult or child since 1964 and
that no execution for any other non-homicide crime had occurred since
1963.293 Moreover, respondent Louisiana was the only state since 1964
to have even sentenced a person to death for raping a child, while
petitioner Kennedy was only one of two convicts then on death row for
committing non-homicide crimes. 294 Predicated on the combination of
the history of the death penalty for rape of a child and other non-
homicide crimes, the numbers of state statutes embracing and barring
the penalty for child rapists, the consistency of the rate of change
manifested by those statutes, and state practice vis-A-vis such
executions, the Kennedy Court concluded that a national consensus
indeed existed against capital punishment for child rape.
295
Without pausing to examine whether an international consensus
complemented the American one or to explain why no such examination
was undertaken, the Justices broached the third analytical criterion of
bringing to bear the Court's own independent judgment on whether
288. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2656-57.
289. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
290. Id. at 789-93, 801.
291. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657.
292. Id. at 2657.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2657-58.
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executing child rapists offends the Eighth Amendment.296 In this
exercise, the Kennedy Court reviewed whether, in light of relevant case
law, imposition of the death penalty for the offense of child rape is
proportional.297 Without digressing into the particulars of that initial
judgment call, which are of no moment in connection with this Article's
mission, Kennedy found an unacceptable disproportionality in allowing
the execution of someone for the act of child rape when the perpetrator
298did not cause a death as part of his crime.
The Kennedy Justices amplified upon the proportionality analysis by
delving into the constituent questions of whether the death penalty for
child rape would fulfill the penalty's two time-honored penological or
social justifications: retribution and deterrence. 299 Of course, if neither
justification could be served by execution, then execution would
necessarily be a disproportionate punishment.300 The majority opinion
posits that it cannot be maintained with any certitude that capital
punishment would never avenge the crime committed or never deter
other capital crimes.30 Nonetheless, Kennedy articulates reservations to
finding proportionality on this basis. 30 2 For example, would inflicting
the death penalty "balance[]" out the hurt to the victim? 30 3 In this regard,
the Justices were troubled that classifying child rape as a capital case
would usually require the young victim to tell his or her brutal,
embarrassing story to law enforcement personnel. Additionally, at trial
the child would be required to confront the harrowing choice of whether
to testify so as to precipitate the assailant's death.30 4 These roles would
assuredly add insult to injury rather than make the injured whole. The
Justices were equally apprehensive about the danger of fabricated child-
victim testimony, induced or otherwise, which could expose the
defendant to wrongful execution. 30 5 Nor would the death penalty for
child rape further the goal of deterrence if the punishment inspired non-
reporting of other child rapes.30 6 Yet, if victims fear that the perpetrators
296. Id. at 2657-64. In both Atkins and Roper, the Court looked for objective indicia of standards
of decency in international law and/or the domestic laws of other countries. See supra notes 213-15,
254-60 and accompanying text.
297. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2659-64.
298. Id. at 2659-61.
299. Id. at 2661-64.
300. Id. at 2662.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 2661-64.
303. Id. at 2662.
304. Id. at 2662-63.
305. Id. at 2663.
306. Id. at 2663-64.
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will be executed, a common anxiety when defendant is a family
member, then children may be more reluctant to reveal the attack. 30 7 In
sum, the Justices' independent judgment under the Eighth Amendment
caused them to agree with the national consensus and therefore
invalidate capital punishment for child rapists.
30 8
When tracking the Court's reasoning in deciding Atkins, Roper, and
Kennedy, it is easy to lose one's bearings in the eddying vortex of
numerical detail. The effort, however, is well worth the vertigo.
Attentive analysis of these cases is of great value in yielding standards
for ascertaining the presence of a consensus against a punishment309 and
for projecting how the Court may independently judge the Eighth
Amendment bona fides of punishments in future cases. 310 These
standards should, if stare decisis is given its due, reliably foreshadow
what should happen in the next suit against public school corporal
punishment under the Amendment.
3. Application of the Second and Third Analytical Criteria Under the
Atkins-Roper-Kennedy Trilogy to Public School Corporal Punishment
a. Application of the Second Criterion
i. Determination of the Existence of a National Consensus
Since the second criterion from the trilogy is to decide whether
standards of decency are incompatible with a punishment and since an
American consensus against a punishment is a guide to the existence of
such standards, it becomes paramount whether there is a national
consensus against public school corporal punishment. According to
Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, a leading indicator on this score is state
statutes.
311
The three cases each sought a sign of consensus in the total of states
which, by the year the case was heard before the Court, had enacted and
retained legislation banning the challenged punishment.3 1 2 A problem
here is that there is no comparable Supreme Court hearing to mark the
year. Thus, by default, the clock must stop in 2008, the year in which
this Article was completed.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 2664-65.
309. See supra notes 194-205,234-57, 269-81 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 216-21, 261-64, 296-308 and accompanying text.
311. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651,2656-57; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005); Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-14 (2002).
312. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2651-53; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-16.
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As of the foregoing date, a total of twenty-eight states have banned all
school corporal punishment through laws having state-wide effect, 313
while some school districts within the remaining twenty-two states have
313. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 4, § 07.0 10(c) (2007); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49001 (West 2007);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53A-18(1), (6) (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 702 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 302A-1 141 (2006); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-24 (2007); IOWA CODE § 280.21 (2007); MD. CODE
ANN., EDUC. § 7-306(a) (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.71, § 37G (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 380.1312(3)-(4) (2007); MINN. STAT. § 121A.58 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-4-302(3)-(4)
(2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-295 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.4633 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18A:6-1 (West 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 19.5 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-
19-02 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.250(12) (2007); 22 PA. CODE § 12.5 (2007); UTAH ADMIN. CODE
r. 277-608-2(B) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161a(b)-(c) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.1
(West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.150.300 (2007); W. VA. CODE § 18A-5-1(e) (2007); WIS. STAT.
§ 118.31 (2007).
Maine's legislation is rather oblique on school corporal punishment inasmuch as the
prohibition on the punishment is by negative inference. 2007 Me. Legis. Serv. 173 (West). Subsection I
of the statute grants parents and other adults responsible for a child the power to use a reasonable
amount of force on the child if the adult "reasonably believes it necessary to prevent or punish
such.., person's misconduct"; however, subsection 2 gives a teacher authority to use force on a student
only if the teacher "reasonably believes it necessary to control the disturbing behavior or to remove" the
student from the scene of such a disturbance. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, while caretakers of
the child named in subsection I may use physical force on their charges to prevent or punish
misbehavior, section 2 specifically singles out teachers as being entitled to use physical force not to
punish, but only to handle a disturbance. That this is an accurate interpretation of the Maine statute is
underscored by a Department of Education statement advising that school personnel do not have the
right to corporally punish students. ME. DEP'T OF EDUC., SCH. HEALTH MANUAL: ABUSE AND NEGLECT
OF CHILDREN 1-2 (2006), http://www.maine.gov/education/sh/abuseneglect/abuse06.pdf.
Rhode Island has no legislation forbidding corporal punishment of children in the schools.
The state Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education has, though, promulgated
regulations prohibiting the punishment in the public schools. R.I. BD. OF REGENTS FOR ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY EDUC., PHYSICAL RESTRAINT REGULATIONS §3.6 (2002), http://www.rules.state.ri.u
s/rules/released/pdf/DESE/DESE_3826.pdf.
South Dakota statutes on school corporal punishment are baffling. One declares, in part, that
"[slupeintendents, principals, supervisors, and teachers and their aids and assistants, have the authority,
to use the physical force that is reasonable and necessary for supervisory control over students." S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-2 (2007). Another provides that a teacher may employ moderate, reasonable
and necessary force to restrain or correct a child. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-5 (2007). Taken at face
value, these enactments would not appear to place South Dakota in the anti-paddling column. The old
bromide that warns against judging a book by its cover applies here to the contents as well. The South
Dakota Deputy Attorney General and Counsel to the state's Department of Education has previously
acknowledged that the language of these statutes could be construed either to allow or outlaw school
corporal punishment. Telephone Interview with Craig Eichstadt, S.D. Deputy Attorney General and
Counsel to the S.D. Dep't of Educ. (June 17, 2004) [hereinafter Eichstadt Interview]. However, he
related that whenever South Dakota school personnel inquire as to his opinion about the legal status of
school corporal punishment in that state, he tells them that the punishment is prohibited. Id. What
prompts him to do so is the legislative history of Section 13-32-2. The present statutory wording amends
a former version which averred that school personnel had the "authority, to administer physical
punishment on an insubordinate or disobedient student" in order to maintain "supervisory centrol over
the student." Id. The amendment notably deleted the phrase "physical punishment on an insubordinate or
disobedient student," thereby implying that the physical force now permitted by this section may not be
for punitive purposes. Id.
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banned the practice as well. 314 Nor have rule makers at the national level
evinced much eagerness for physical punishment of children as a
disciplinary tool. For instance, a federal administrative regulation
enjoins corporal punishment of preschoolers enrolled in Head Start, a
federally funded child development program that, among other things,
prepares very young children from low-income families for school.315
A comparison of these statistics with their analogues from the trilogy
cases is highly persuasive, though not conclusive, evidence of a national
consensus antagonistic to school corporal punishment. The total of states
with anti-paddling laws in 2008 is admittedly a colossal sixteen shy of
the grand total of forty-five abolitionist states at the relevant date in
Kennedy;316 but, this is hardly dispositive. The anti-paddling figure is
only two less than the grand total of thirty states that, by the relevant
date, had rejected the juvenile death penalty in Roper3 17 and four less
than the grand total of thirty-two states that, by the relevant date, had
opposed the death penalty for the mentally retarded in Atkins.3 18 In
Roper, too, the Court suggested that a simple majority of states, i.e.,
twenty-six, would be indicative of a national consensus, 319 a suggestion
echoed in Kennedy as well.320 The grand total of twenty-eight anti-
paddling states, of course, exceeds that threshold.
There are two hidden factors that enhance this already impressive
showing. First, the twenty-eight to twenty-two ratio of state-wide laws
on school corporal punishment does not reflect the fact that many school
districts, in the bloc of twenty-two nonabolitionist states, have
interdicted the punishment anyway. 321 There was no equivalent
interdiction on a local level in Atkins, Roper, or Kennedy.322 Second,
there is the fact that the twenty-eight anti-paddling states target for
abolition the one practice of corporally punishing public
314. School districts disallowing school corporal punishment in states that have not banned it as a
matter of state law include Miami-Dade, Houston, Memphis, Austin, Fort Worth, Atlanta, San Antonio,
Denver, Tucson, and Dallas. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS),
http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=1001argest (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
315. 45 C.F.R. § 1304.52(h)(1)(iv) (2008).
316. See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
319. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
320. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2653 (2008), reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008)
(stating that "[t]he evidence of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty for child rapists, as
with respect to juveniles, mentally retarded offenders, and vicarious felony murderers, shows divided
opinion but, on balance, an opinion against it").
321. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
322. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-65 (referring to no local bans); Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-79
(2005) (same); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306-21 (2002) (same).
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schoolchildren. 323 In contrast, in Atkins and Roper, respectively, only
eighteen states targeted for abolition the discrete punishment contested
in each of those cases. 324 (The other abolitionist states in Atkins and
Roper barred the death penalty for everyone and never addressed the
contested punishments by themselves.) 325
It should be remembered that another, even more crucial indicator of
national consensus against a punishment is the consistency of the rate of
change against a punishment. 326 The Court has typically tried to express
this metric with unsynthesized data327 or impressionistic descriptions,
instead of mathematically deducing a single percentage rate. 328 It will
additionally be remembered that the precedents from the trilogy more or
less follow a five-step process in producing these data and
descriptions. 329 The same process will be used here in order to arrive at
the rate of change and its consistency regarding the abolition of school
corporal punishment, though the findings will then also be converted
into percentages which should facilitate comparison among the rates.
In establishing the appropriate time period for making sense of the
data, the start date probably should be 1977, the year when Ingraham v.
Wright held such punishment to be immune from the Eighth
Amendment's strictures.330 That is the last and only time that the Court
addressed the status of the punishment under the Amendment. Using
1977 as the start date not only accords with precedent, but has the
additional virtue of logicality. States' de jure rebuffs of a punishment,
after the Court has spared it from constitutional ignominy, necessarily
reflects that those states must have harbored such earnest antipathy
towards the punishment that its constitutionality had no decisive
influence in shaping state policy.
As previously mentioned, the terminus of the time period must be
2008. The selection of that year is a function of the circumstance that, in
light of precedent, no other seems reasonable or, for that matter,
possible. In Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy, the Court opted for end dates
coinciding with the year it heard oral argument in each case.33 1 Since
323. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
324. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564;Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
325. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
326. See supra notes 192, 240, 278-81 and accompanying text.
327. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-15 (listing states which, within a specified time, legislated
against the death penalty for the mentally retarded).
328. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2656-57 (2008), reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1
(2008); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68.
329. See supra notes 194-205,234-45,274-88 and accompanying text.
330. 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977).
331. See supra notes 200, 240, 270 and accompanying text.
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there is not yet a Supreme Court decision overturning, modifying, or
reaffirming Ingraham, the end date here must be 2008, the year in which
this Article was completed. The proper time period, then, running from
1977 to 2008, is thirty-one years.
Although the Ingraham majority stated that as of 1977 only two
states, New Jersey and Massachusetts, 332 had prohibited school corporal
punishment, Maine also had previously done so. 333 By 2008, twenty-
eight states banned all public school corporal punishment via laws
having state-wide application. 334 Subtraction of three from twenty-eight
means that, over a thirty-one year period, twenty-five states have
forbidden school corporal punishment. During this interval, no states
legislated to authorize or re-authorize the practice. 335 The latter two
statistics, therefore, show that the consistency of the rate of change is
100%, exactly the same as in Atkins and Roper.336
Because juxtaposition of the rates of change among Atkins, Roper,
Kennedy, and school corporal punishment involves so many numbers
flying around the page, the following chart337 is provided to make the
comparison more readily visible and intelligible.
Number of Number of Number of
States States States
Outlawing a Outlawing a Outlawing a
Punishment at Punishment at Punishment
Time Start Date of End Date of During Time
Punishment Periods Time Period Time Period Period
Public
School
Corporal 31 yrs. 3 28 25 against
Punishment (1977-2008) 0 for
Death
Penalty for
Mentally
Retarded 13 yrs. 16 32 16 against
Offenders (1989-2002) 0 for
332. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 663.
333. Act of June 16, 1975, ch. 499, § 1, 1975 Me. Laws. 1273, 1289.
334. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
335. Research unearthed no state authorizations or re-authorizations of corporal punishment in the
public schools between 1977 and 2008.
336. See supra notes 193, 248 and accompanying text.
337. The numbers set forth in the chart are identical to those given in Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy
and described in the textual material above. See supra notes 269-88 and accompanying text.
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Number of Number of Number of
States States States
Outlawing a Outlawing a Outlawing a
Punishment at Punishment at Punishment
Time Start Date of End Date of During Time
Punishment Periods Time Period Time Period Period
Juvenile
Death 15 yrs. 25 30 5 against
Penalty (1989-2002) 0 for
13 yrs. 0 against
Death (1995-2008) ?338 44 6 for
Penalty for
Child 36 yrs. 0 against
Rapists (1972-2008) 6 for
For purposes of determining respective rates of change, the statistics
of most interest in the above chart are set forth in the last column, on the
far right-hand side of the page, under the heading "Number of States
Outlawing a Punishment During Time Period." It should be immediately
apparent that, by themselves, the number of states outlawing school
corporal punishment far outstrips the analogous figures of sixteen states
doing likewise against the death penalty for the mentally retarded, five
states doing likewise against the juvenile death penalty, and six states
legislatively embracing the death penalty for child rapists. However, that
comparison, without more, presents an incomplete and therefore
distorted picture of the various rates of change. A full understanding of
the rate of change respecting each punishment, requires adding into the
calculus the assigned length of time within which each set of legal
changes took place. The chart lists these periods of time in the second
column from the left. Only once the time variable is included can total
and yearly rates of change, expressed in percentages, be computed for
each punishment; and, only after that is done can the four situations be
338. A question mark appears in the chart above because the majority opinion in Kennedy is
ambiguous regarding the number of states which, at the onsets of the assigned time periods, had either
outlawed or approved the death penalty for child rape. The ambiguity arises from the Court's assertion
that "[iun 1972, Furman invalidated most of the state statutes authorizing the death penalty for the crime
of rape." Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2651 (2008), reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008)
(emphasis added). The uncertainty is compounded by the Court's notation that earlier, in 1925, eighteen
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government had statutes allowing execution for raping a
child or an adult; the opinion does not advise whether or how legal developments might have changed
that number by 1972. Id. The same sort of difficulty obtains for the alternative time period used in
Kennedy as beginning in 1995. The opinion appears to confine discussion of the legal situation from
1995 to 2008 only to re-introduction of statutory permission to use capital punishment for rape of a
child, leaving vague the number of states, if any, that continued to grant such permission after 1995. Id
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compared in a truly accurate way.
The results are positively startling. The rise from three states
prohibiting public school corporal punishment in 1977 to twenty-eight
abolitionist states as of 2008 represents an 830% total increase in the
number of abolitionist states.339 The climb from sixteen states forbidding
the death penalty for mentally retarded convicts as of 1989 to thirty-two
abolitionist states as of 2002 is a 100% total increase in the number of
abolitionist states. 340 The gain from twenty-five states proscribing the
juvenile death penalty as of 1989 to thirty abolitionist states in 2005
constitutes a 20% total increase in the number of abolitionist states.
341
(A total percentage increase in the number of states authorizing the
death penalty for child rapists is not available because Kennedy provides
insufficient data to do the math.342) There is no contest. The total rate of
increase of 830% in relation to school corporal punishment utterly
dwarfs the total rates of increase of either 100% or 20%.
If the focus is shifted to yearly, rather than total, percentage rates of
increase in state prohibitions, the pace of state prohibition of school
corporal punishment again leaves the pertinent state death penalty
prohibitions in the dust. (A yearly percentage increase in the number of
states allowing the death penalty for child rapists is not available for the
same reasons mentioned above vis-A-vis total percentage increases. 343)
The yearly rate of increase of states outlawing school corporal
punishment is a robust 7.5%; the yearly rate of increase of states
interdicting the mentally retarded death penalty amounts to only 5.5%,
and of those eliminating the juvenile death penalty, a meager 1.2%.
These sets of total and yearly percentages make a compelling, if not
unassailable, case that the most important of indicators of a national
consensus establishes the presence of a national consensus against
school corporal punishment. Indeed, it should be kept in mind that these
percentages are still an understatement of the extent of that consensus
because they do not reflect the many school districts which have
forbidden the punishment in nonabolitionist states. 34
The trilogy shows that another index of national consensus
concerning a punishment is state practice in those jurisdictions where the
339. The 830% figure was calculated by subtracting three from twenty-eight and then dividing by
three.
340. The 100% figure was calculated by subtracting sixteen from thirty-two and then dividing by
sixteen.
341. The 20% figure was calculated by subtracting twenty-five from thirty and then dividing by
twenty-five.
342. See supra note 338.
343. See id.
344. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
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punishment is still legal.345 The abolitionist stance adopted by many
school districts within the twenty-two states that still condone school
corporal punishment,346 is probative not only of the rate of legal change
rejecting the punishment, but also manifests that day-to-day use of this
type of discipline is on the decline. The fact that the federal
government's statistics show an annual figure of 223,190 schoolchildren
nationally on the receiving end of the paddle in 2006-2007,347 down
from 301,016 in 2003-2004,348 signals that school administrators and
teachers are growing increasingly reluctant to use the punishment even
when legally empowered to do so. According to federal government
statistics of projected national totals of children subjected to school
corporal punishment, the drop in use of the punishment has been a
constant since before the 1977 Ingraham decision.
349
These data on the frequency of use of school corporal punishment
cannot compete with the statistics on use of the death penalty in Atkins,
Roper, and Kennedy. It should be recalled that in Atkins, the Court
characterized the infliction of the death penalty on mentally retarded
convicts as having been "uncommon" and "truly unusual. 35 ° In Roper,
the Court remarked that implementation of the juvenile death penalty
had been "infrequent." 351 And, in Kennedy, the Court highlighted that
between 1964 and 2008 no one had been put to death for the crime of
rape.352
Although use of school corporal punishment has been steadily
diminishing over the last thirty-one years, it is hardly uncommon, truly
unusual, or infrequent, and it has continued to occur since 1964 with
some regularity in jurisdictions where it is legal.353 Still, the comparison
cannot be made in a vacuum. It is reasonable to surmise that legislators'
sense of urgency about abolishing school corporal punishment would
not be as keen as it has been in relation to abolishing a punishment that
invariably extinguishes human life. It is also probable that many state
345. See supra notes 206, 250, 292 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text.
347. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS), Corporal Punishment in
U.S. Public Schools, http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=statesbanning (last visited July 26,
2008) (basing statistic on data from the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights).
348. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION 2004 tbl.
07A/08A (2007), http://ocrdata.ed.gov/ocr2004rv30/wdsdata.html.
349. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS), Number of Students Struck
Each Year in U.S. Public Schools, http://www.stophitting.com/index.phppage=statesbanning (last
visited July 26, 2008).
350. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
351. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
352. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2657-58 (2008), reh"g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008).
353. See supra notes 345-49 and accompanying text.
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lawmakers are as yet unaware of the deleterious effects of corporal
punishment on children inasmuch as these effects have primarily been
reported in scientific studies and other scholarly literature. 354
The trilogy's invocation of other assorted indicia of national
consensus has been less uniform, but none of the indicia has ever been
held invalid.355 Neither the Kennedy nor the Roper Courts mentioned
polling data,356 but the Atkins Court was impressed with polling data
reflecting "a widespread consensus among Americans" that executing
the mentally retarded is unseemly. 35 7 A 2005 poll of 30,000 Americans
by SurveyUSA discloses that 75% of respondents disapproved of
allowing teachers to spank students. 358 A 75% national disapproval
rating is, by anyone's measure, a widespread, or perhaps even prevalent,
national consensus against school corporal punishment.
The Court in Atkins,359 Roper,36° and Kennedy36'did not canvass
newspaper editorials on the punishments litigated in those actions. But,
if editorials may be considered an expression of popular opinion, it is
edifying to consider the following. A 1994 editorial in USA Today, a
national newspaper that is not known for being an organ of liberal elites
or any other identifiable interest group, opined that school corporal
punishment "will remain too high as long as it's above zero." 362 In
Alabama, where state law still authorizes public school physical
discipline,363 a 2000 issue of the Huntsville Times exhorted area schools
to cease paddling students.364 A similar outcry has cropped up in
354. See infra notes 465-90 and accompanying text.
355. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-65 (failing to invalidate any indicia of national consensus
used in Atkins or Roper); Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-79 (failing to invalidate any indicia of national
consensus used in Atkins); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-21 (failing to invalidate any previously judicially
recognized indicia of national consensus).
356. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-65 (failing to mention polling data as bearing on the
existence of a national consensus); Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-79 (same).
357. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
358. See Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal Punishment of
Children, Converging Evidence from Social Science Research and International Human Rights Law and
Implications for U.S. Public Policy, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 231, 258 (2007) (reporting the
results of the survey).
359. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306-21 (refraining from consulting newspaper editorials as probative
of national consensus).
360. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-79 (refraining from consulting newspaper editorials as bearing
on the existence of a national consensus).
361. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2645-65 (2008), reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1
(2008) (refraining from using newspaper editorials as indicative of a national consensus).
362. Darren Warrensford, End Legal Child Abuse; Stop School Paddlings, USA TODAY, July 18,
1994, at A 14, available at http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=editorials.
363. ALA. CODE § 16-28A-1 (2007).
364. Editorial, Stop School Beatings: Paddling is Archaic and Ineffective, and Local Schools that
Use it Should Stop, THE HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Dec. 19, 2000, at B4.
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newspapers publishing from the other bastions of legalized paddling as
well. Given the news outlets or geographic locations where these
articles were showcased, they are a window of sorts on the
pervasiveness of the public's disillusionment with school corporal
punishment.
The Atkins Court credited a profusion of likeminded opinions coming
from experts and community leaders also with being evocative of a
national consensus. 366 Numerous mainstream professional and civic
organizations have, in fact, taken official positions against school
corporal punishment. Many of these organizations are the most
prestigious in their respective fields of medicine, law, psychology and
education. Although the list is the classic stuff of footnotes, such a
crowded and eminent roster is legally significant enough under the
Eighth Amendment as to warrant inclusion in the text. The list includes
the American Medical Association, American Bar Association,
American Civil Liberties Union, American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Pediatrics, American
Academy of Family Physicians, American Psychiatric Association,
American Psychological Association, National Association for State
Departments of Education, National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, National Association of Elementary School Principals,
National Association of Social Workers, and the National Parent
Teacher Association. 367 Furthermore, the United Methodist Church
General Assembly and the Unitarian Universalist General Assembly
have gone on record as condemning school corporal punishment;368 as of
April 2005, 174 Catholic dioceses have either banned or refused to use
corporal punishment in that denomination's schools.3 69  In short,
professional opinion as well as that of influential public leaders is
wholly in accord with the overwhelming lay aversion to this practice.
The outpouring appears to easily surpass the Atkins Court's reliance on
"several organizations with germane expertise" and some religious
365. Anti-paddling editorials have appeared in the Inverness Chronicle (in Florida), the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, the Indianapolis Star, The Charlotte Observer (in North Carolina), the Cleveland
Plain Dealer, and the Dallas Morning News, among others. See Center for Effective Discipline,
Discipline at School (NCACPS), Editorials Calling for an End to Corporal Punishment,
http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=editorials (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
366. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
367. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS), U.S. Organizations
Opposed to School Corporal Punishment, http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page-usorgs (last
visited Nov. 10, 2007).
368. Id.
369. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS), Study of Corporal
Punishment Policies in Catholic Schools (March 2006), available at http://www.stophitting.com/inde
x.php?page=cpincatholic.
2009] 1379
HeinOnline -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1379 2008-2009
1380 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW [Vol.77
representatives' amicus curiae brief against the death penalty for
mentally retarded criminals, in order to find evidence of national
consensus.3 70 (Roper and Kennedy neglected expert opinion for this
purpose. 371)
The movement against school corporal punishment thus either meets
or exceeds each metric used by the Atkins and Roper Courts to reckon
national consensus. Were the Supreme Court faced today with a suit
contending that public school corporal punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment, the Court would be hard pressed not to find an American
consensus unequivocally against school corporal punishment.
372
ii. Determination of the Existence of an International Consensus
As was described in Parts IV.A and IV.B.2 of this article, the
existence of a national consensus against such punishment does not
finish the analysis under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
370. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (emphasis added).
371. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2645-65 (2008), reh'g denied, 129 S. Ct. 1
(2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555-79 (2005).
372. Since Roper was rendered in 2005, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor have been
replaced, respectively, by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of
Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 647, 647 (2006). The ascension to the Court of Chief Justice
Roberts is not likely to put the Court on a new course inasmuch as he and his predecessor appear to be
cut from the same cloth. Id. at 647. The substitution of Justice Alito for Justice O'Connor has already
had repercussions for the Court's direction on the abortion controversy. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding a federal ban on partial birth abortion as against a substantive due process
challenge).
However, even though Justice Alito and former Justice O'Connor may not see eye to eye on
a variety of issues, this changing of the guard does not seem to presage any sharp deviations from the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence used in Atkins and Roper for detecting a national consensus by
counting states hostile to a disputed punishment. It is Atkins and Roper themselves that provide clues as
to why continuity should be anticipated.
In Roper, Justice O'Connor dissented from the majority's holding that the juvenile death
penalty violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 543 U.S. at 587-607 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Thus, in the event that Justice Alito is averse to siding with the plaintiffs in a suit
challenging of school corporal punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it would not upset the balance
of power struck in Roper, a balance still favorable to holding a challenged punishment unconstitutional
under sufficiently analogous circumstances of national consensus, etc.
In Atkins, Justice O'Connor joined the majority in striking down the death penalty for the
mentally retarded as violative of the Amendment. 536 U.S. at 306-21. That only three Justices dissented
in Atkins-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas-intimates that the loss of Justice
O'Connor need not jeopardize the chances of plaintiffs prevailing in a suit on the Eighth Amendment
status of school corporal punishment. Id. at 321-54. Plaintiffs arguably should still be able to command
a majority of the Justices, provided that evidence is adduced showing the punishment is sufficiently
objectionable to the American people.
The advent of the Eighth Amendment decision in Kennedy v. Louisiana is recent
confirmation of the above predictions. 128 S. Ct. 264 1.
HeinOnline -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1380 2008-2009
SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
Punishments Clause.373 Prior to Kennedy, the precedents established
that, in ferreting out modem standards of decency, the Court should
resist any inclination toward parochialism and extend its horizons to
international law and the laws of other countries.374 That Kennedy
ignored evidence of global consensus does not alter the continued
validity or wisdom of this protocol.
School corporal punishment is a violation of international human
rights law.375 Interpretation of major human rights treaties do not leave
the least wiggle room for arguing otherwise. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (Treaty on Treaties) sets forth the rules governing
treaty interpretation. 376 The approach of the Treaty on Treaties is that
"[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose." 377 The Treaty on Treaties
defines "context" as a treaty's text, its preamble, and any annexes, as
well as certain other agreements, instruments, practices, and rules that
relate to the treaty.
378
Human rights treaties, like the U.S. Constitution, are positively
groaning with what may be described as "omnibus terms" or "omnibus
phrases. ' 379 An omnibus term or phrase is language broad enough to
encompass one or more implicit connotations as part of its ordinary
meaning. 380 An example of an omnibus phrase familiar to American
jurists is the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution's Fourteenth
Amendment, which declares that "[n]o State shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 381 "Equal
protection," as construed by the Supreme Court, has come to stand for
many included implied principles such as a prohibition on de jure racial
segregation of students in public elementary and secondary schools
382
373. See supra notes 159-73, 309-10 and accompanying text.
374. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 788, 796 n.22 (1982) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion); Aarons, supra note
164, at 199-205.
375. See infra notes 384-93 and accompanying text.
376. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Treaty on Treaties].
377. Id. atart. 3 1, .
378. Id. at art. 3 1, 2.
379. BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 48.
380. Id.
381. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
382. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and the unconstitutionality of irrational state discrimination against the
disabled.383
Similarly, authorized treaty interpreters have understood omnibus
terms or phrases in several human rights treaties to interdict tacitly, but
nonetheless surely, all school corporal punishment. 384 The Convention
on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter the Children's Convention)385
contains multiple omnibus terms from which the interdiction has been
inferred as reasonably within these terms' ordinary meanings.
386
383. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (plurality opinion).
384. For a detailed and comprehensive study of the treaties and their interpretations showing
school (and other) corporal punishment of children to be a human rights violation, see BITENSKY, supra
note 18, at 47-151.
Examples of representative interpretations are: U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
General Comment No. 8: The Right of the Child to Protection from Corporal Punishment and other
Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter
Children's Committee General Comment No. 8] (declaring that all corporal punishment of children, no
matter how light, by whom administered, or in what venue, violates provisions of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 1: The Aims of
Education, art. 29(1), 8, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/I (Apr. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Children's
Committee General Comment No. 1] (stating that school corporal punishment is inconsistent with the
Convention on the Rights of the Child); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations: Venezuela, 53(a)(i), U.N. Doc. CRC/C/VEN/CO/2 (Oct. 5, 2007) (urging Venezuela to
pay heed to the requirement, flowing from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, that the state party
must enact a ban on corporal punishment of children "in all places"); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Greece, 15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/83/GRC
(Apr. 25, 2005) (recommending that, in order to comply with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Greece should prohibit school corporal punishment); U.N. Human Rights Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Poland, 25, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add. 110 (July 29, 1999) (welcoming, pursuant to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Poland's "abolition by law of corporal punishment in schools," but expressing concern
"that this change in the law is not fully being implemented"); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, 41, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (Dec. 8,
1999) (positing that school corporal punishment is incompatible with the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Concluding
Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Malta, 22, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.101 (Dec. 14, 2004) (indicating that compliance with the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights necessitates prohibition of corporal punishment of children in the
family as well as in schools and other institutions); U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and
Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: South Africa, 25, U.N. Doe. CAT/C/ZAF/CO/1
(Dec. 7, 2006) (evincing concem that, under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, South Africa should ensure that its legislation banning corporal
punishment in schools is strictly implemented); Report of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Supp. No. 44, 200, U.N. Doc. A/47/44 (June 26, 1992) (asserting that school corporal
punishment in Australia contravenes the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment); EUR. COMM. OF SOC. RIGHTS, EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER:
CONCLUSIONS 173 (2003) (finding that France violated the Revised European Social Charter by failing
to pass laws outlawing corporal punishment of children at home and in schools or other institutions).
385. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No.
49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Children's Convention].
386. See, e.g., Children's Convention, supra note 385, at art. 19, 1 (prohibiting "all forms of
physical ... violence," in addition to "injury or abuse," against children); id. at art. 28, 2 (requiring
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Article 28, paragraph 2 takes pride of place in this regard. The provision
enunciates that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to
ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with
the child's human dignity and in conformity with the present
Convention., 387 On its face, the provision makes no reference to
"corporal punishment," "spanking," or an idiographically equivalent
synonym. Article 28, paragraph 2 instead speaks to generic "school
discipline," an omnibus phrase broad enough in its ordinary meaning to
cover the gamut of school disciplinary tactics. So, how do we know
whether article 28 is proscribing corporal punishment when it demands
that school discipline must not offend the child's dignity or the
Convention?
Article 28, without more, seems to put the uninitiated on an Escher-
ian analytical staircase leading nowhere or who-knows-where. The
treaty drafters, however, were not as enthralled with "wandering around
in enigmas" as the artist.388 The Children's Convention repeatedly
guarantees the child's human dignity389 and these guarantees have been
repeatedly construed to foreclose corporally punishing children.390 The
rest of the Convention abounds with omnibus provisions,391 in addition
to article 28, which have also been interpreted to implicitly forbid
corporal punishment of children. 392 This profusion is homogeneous with
that school discipline must be compatible with the child's human dignity and the rest of the Children's
Convention); id. at art. 37, 7 (a) (outlawing the perpetration against children of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).
387. Id. at art. 28, 1 2.
388. M.C. Escher: The Official Website, http://www.mcescher.com (follow "Quotes" hyperlink)
(last visited Nov. 27, 2007).
389. E.g., Children's Convention, supra note 385, at pmbl., art. 37, (c), art. 39.
390. E.g., Children's Committee General Comment No. 8, supra note 384, 1 2, 5, 7, 16-17, 21-
22, 26-27; Children's Committee General Comment No. 1, supra note 384, at art. 29(1), 8.
391. E.g., Children's Convention, supra note 385, at art. 19, $ 1 (interdicting all types of physical
violence against children); id. at art. 37, (a) (prohibiting subjection of children to torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment); id. at art. 39 (stipulating that states parties must take all
appropriate measures to further the physical and psychological recovery of children who have been the
victims of any form of cruel or degrading treatment and requiring that the recovery must occur in an
environment fostering the child's dignity); id. at art. 24, 3 (outlawing traditional practices prejudicial
to children's health).
392. E.g., Children's Committee General Comment No. 8, supra note 384, passim; U.N. Comm.
on the Rights of the Child, Report on the Twenty-Eighth Session, 715, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/I 11 (Nov.
28, 2001) (citing Children's Convention article 24, paragraph 3 as meaning that corporal punishment of
children is not allowed); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Andorra, 11 39-40, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/I5/Add. 176 (Mar. 11,
2002) (interpreting article 19, paragraph 1 of the Children's Convention as forbidding corporal
punishment of children); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Gambia, 17 32-33, 67-68, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/i 5/Add. 165 (Nov.
6, 2001) (declaring that Children's Convention article 37, paragraph (a) requires Gambia to abolish
corporal punishment of children in its juvenile justice system); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
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the overarching and central object and purpose of the Children's
Convention which is to protect children from physical violence, of
which corporal punishment is a subspecies.
393
Naturally, the dilemma of how much credibility to give these
interpretations depends upon who is doing the interpreting. As most
Americans unfortunately are by now aware, a clever attorney or
politician may even cast doubt on what "is" is. 3 9 4 In any event, the
interpretations described above suffer from no credibility problems,
absurd or otherwise. For, they are the work of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (hereinafter the Children's Committee), the official
body created by the Children's Convention to monitor treaty compliance
and interpret treaty terms. 3
95
It is true that many international law scholars tend to regard such
monitoring committee emanations-usually embodied in General
Comments or Concluding Observations 396 -as "soft" law, sans binding
force.397 Without getting into an extended discourse on this aspect of
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Burundi, 741, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/I 5/Add.133 (Oct. 16, 2000) (directing Burundi to end corporal punishment of children within
the family and in schools, the juvenile justice system, and alternative care, because of Children's
Convention article 37, paragraph (a)); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations
of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Islamic Republic of Iran, 1139-40, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/15/Add.123 (June 28, 2000) (construing article 39 of the Children's Convention as prohibiting
corporal punishment of children).
393. Children's Convention, supra note 385, at art. 19, 1 (obligating states parties to take all
appropriate measures to protect children from all forms of physical violence); BITENSKY, supra note 18,
at 53-56; Susan O'Rourke Von Struensee, Violence, Exploitation and Children: Highlights of the
United Nations Children's Convention and International Response to Children 's Human Rights, 18
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 589, 592-93 (1995); cf The Secretary-General, Report of the
Independent Expert for the United Nations Study on Violence Against Children, T$ 1, 8, 81, 83, 85, 88,
98, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/61/299 (Aug. 29, 2006) (stating that violence
against children contradicts human rights laws of which the Children's Convention is in the forefront),
available at http://www.violencestudy.org/IMG/pdf/English-2-2.pdf.
394. See BBC News, On This Day 21 September, 1998: Clinton's Grand Jury Testimony
Released, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/21/newsid-2525000/2525339.stm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2008).
395. Children's Convention, supra note 385, at art.43.
396. See BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 51-52 (describing the nature of treaty monitoring committee
General Comments and Concluding Observations); Michael O'Flaherty, The Concluding Observations
of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 27, 31-32 (2006) (describing the
nature of treaty monitoring committee Concluding Observations); Stephen R. Tully, The Contribution of
Human Rights to Universal Energy Access, 4 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 518, 547-48 (2006)
(explaining the nature of treaty monitoring committee General Comments).
397. See JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 48 (2005)
(describing the legal positivist view that the only sources of international law are listed in article 38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice and that pronouncements by international organizations
(like treaty monitoring committees) are not on that list); RICHARD B. LILLICH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 136 (4th ed. 2006) (referring to non-treaty
international instruments as soft law that is "not legally binding").
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international law, suffice it to say that there are at least five reasons to
treat these committee interpretations as dispositive. First, even as so-
called soft-law, monitoring committee interpretations are considered by
many scholars to be "authoritative" 398 and "significant" and to carry
"great weight." 399 This is as it should be inasmuch as the Children's
Committee, as per Children's Convention mandate, must consist of
"experts of high moral standing and recognized competence in the field"
covered by the Convention. 400 It is difficult to conceive of who else
would be so knowledgeable and trustworthy in elucidating the
Convention's full meaning. Second, the legal traction of the General
Comments and Concluding Observations against corporal punishment of
children is magnified by their great volume and unwavering
consistency. 40 1 Third, the principle contained in General Comments and
Concluding Observations against corporal punishment of children has
been reiterated and developed by international human rights law
scholars' published works40 2 some of which, under the Statute of the
International Court of Justice,40 3 may be deemed a source of "hard"
law.40 4 Fourth, because human rights treaties typically lack "teeth," in
398. Cynthia Price Cohen, A Guide to Linguistic Interpretation of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child: Articles 1, 41 and 45, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN AMERICA: U.N. CONVENTION ON THE
RIGHTS OF THE CHILD COMPARED WITH UNITED STATES LAW 33, 33 (Cynthia Price Cohen & Howard
A. Davidson eds., 1990).
399. Yuji Iwasawa, The Domestic Impact of International Human Rights Standards. The Japanese
Experience, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 245, 258-59 (Philip Alston
& James Crawford eds., 2000).
400. Children's Convention, supra note 385, at art. 43, 2.
401. See BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 53 & nn.35-36, 56 & nn.44-46, 57 & n.50, 58 & n.52, 59 &
nn.57, 60, 61 & n.66, 63 & nn.75-76, 64 & n.85, 65 & nn.88-89, 67, 68 & n.l10, 69 & n.115, 70 &
nn.120, 124, 71, 72 & n.134, 73 & nn.143-44, 74 & n.149, 75 & n.158, 79 & nn.204-O5, 82 & nn.223-
24, 83, 84 & nn. 235-36, 85 & nn.241-44, 92 & nn.275-77, 93, 94 & nn.285-88, 95 & n.295, 96 &
n.298, 98 & n.313, 111 & nn.388, 392-93, 112 & nn.394-95, 115 & nn.408-09, 412; see also GLOBAL
INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN, ENDING LEGALISED VIOLENCE
AGAINST CHILDREN: GLOBAL REPORT 2007, at 2 (2007) (quoting Professor Yanghee Lee, Chairperson
of the Children's Committee, for the proposition that this Committee has recommended to more than
130 states parties that they should prohibit all corporal punishment of children), available at
http://www.endcorporalpunishment.orglpages/pdfs/reports/GlobalReport2007.pdf
402. See, e.g., BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 47-151; Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace
Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 388-421 (1998); Claire Breen, The Corporal Punishment of Children in New
Zealand: The Case for Abolition, 2002 N.Z. L. REV. 359, 368; Cynthia Price Cohen, Freedom from
Corporal Punishment: One of the Human Rights of Children, 2 N.Y.L. ScH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 95, 101-
11 (1984); Judith Ennew, Shame and Physical Pain: Cultural Relativity, Children, Torture and
Punishment, in CHILDHOOD ABUSED: PROTECTING CHILDREN AGAINST TORTURE, CRUEL, INHUMAN,
AND DEGRADING TREATMENT AND PUNISHMENT 7, 23-24 (Geraldine Van Bueren ed., 1998);
Parkinson, supra note 134, at 278-79.
403. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
404. See ALVAREZ, supra note 397, at 47 (describing the "doctrine of sources" of international
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terms of enforceability, the difference between nonbinding General
Comments and Concluding Observations and treaty law is close to, if
not actually, illusory, 40 5 i.e., enforceability problems with committee
interpretations are no reason to demote them to a lesser legal stature than
treaties. Fifth, some international law experts maintain that the "soft
law" nomenclature for documents like General Comments is becoming
outmoded inasmuch as such monitoring committee interpretations are
increasingly serving the vital function of spelling out what cryptic treaty
language means.40 Their idea is that, over the past fifty-five years,
monitoring committee pronouncements have become an exponentially
proliferating phenomenon on the verge of transitioning to a "hard" law
equivalency.
Finally, perhaps the time has come to challenge the conventional
wisdom that international law's prohibition on corporal punishment is of
the "soft" persuasion. Article 19, paragraph 1 of the Children's
Convention makes no bones about directing states parties to protect the
child from "all forms of physical ... violence. 40 8 Hitting is a form of
physical violence. Corporal punishment is a form of hitting. Therefore,
corporal punishment is a form of physical violence. The syllogism is
self-evident, and not dependent on a Committee interpretation of article
19. Thus, article 19's interdiction of such punishment may, after all, be
unmediated treaty law and quite as "hard" as the many express treaty
bans, for example, on the juvenile death penalty.40 9
Leaving nothing to chance, the Children's Committee has issued
General Comments emphatically and explicitly declaring that Children's
Convention article 28, paragraph 2, as well as other provisions of the
Convention, forbids all school corporal punishment. 410  General
Comment No. 8, which is titled, "The right of the child to protection
from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of
punishment (Articles 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, inter alia),"411 states in no
uncertain terms:
law as arising from article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice).
405. Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE
ROLE OF NoN-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 449-63 (Dinah Shelton ed.,
2000), reprinted in LILLICH ET AL., supra note 397, at 137, 142 (pointing out that while states comply
with non-binding human rights norms only some of the time, they also comply with binding human
rights norms only some of the time as well).
406. Id. at 139, 141-42.
407. See ALVAREZ, supra note 397, at49, 596-601.
408. Children's Convention, supra note 385, at art. 19, I.
409. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
410. Children's Committee General Comment No. 8, supra note 384, 18-21; Children's
Committee General Comment No. 1, supra note 384, at art. 29(1), 8.
411. Children's Committee General Comment No. 8, supra note 384.
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18. Article 37 of the Convention requires States to ensure that "no child
shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." This is complemented and extended by article
19, which requires States to "take all appropriate legislative,
administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from
all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse .... while in the
care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care
of the child." There is no ambiguity: "all forms of physical or mental
violence" does not leave room for any level of legalized violence against
children. Corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of
punishment are forms of violence and States must take all appropriate
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to eliminate
them.
20. Article 19 and article 28, paragraph 2, do not refer explicitly to
corporal punishment.... But the Convention, like all human rights
instruments, must be regarded as a living instrument, whose interpretation
develops over time....
21.... [I]t is clear that [corporal punishment] directly conflicts with the
equal and inalienable rights of children to respect for their human dignity
and physical integrity.
While there are hundreds of Concluding Observations promulgated by
the Children's Committee of the same import,413 General Comment No.
8 is quoted at length, not only to show the Committee's utter lack of
412. Id. 77 18, 20-21.
413. E.g., U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Malaysia, In 77-78,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MYS/CO/I (June 25, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations: Slovakia, 36-37, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/SVK/CO/2 (July 10, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Mali, 39-40, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/MLI/CO/2 (May 3,
2007); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Suriname, IT 36-37, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/SUR/CO/2 (June 18, 2007);U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations: Kazakhstan, 36-37, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/KAZ/CO/3 (June 19, 2007); U.N. COMm. ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, Concluding Observations: Kenya, % 34-35, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/KEN/CO/2
(June 19, 2007); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Oman, 7 33-35,
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/OMN/CO/2 (Sept. 29, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding
Observations: Lithuania, M 37-38, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/LTU/CO/2 (Mar. 17, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: United Republic of Tanzania, 33-34, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/TZA/CO/2 (June 21, 2006); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations:
The Republic of the Congo, M 37-39, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/COG/CO/I (Oct. 20, 2006).
For another partial listing of Children's Committee Concluding Observations against
corporal punishment of children, see Universal Human Rights Index of United Nations Documents,
http://www.universalhumanrights index.org/ (search "corporal punishment" in "Search Annotations")
(last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
In addition, refer to GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO END ALL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN,
supra note 401, at 2 (quoting Professor Yanghee Lee, Chairperson of the Children's Committee, for the
proposition that the Committee has recommended to more than 130 nations that they should eliminate
corporal punishment of children in order to comply with the Children's Convention).
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hesitation in classifying corporal punishment of children as a violation
of the Children's Convention, but also to convey the Committee's
analytical acumen and sense of responsibility in interpreting the treaty
on this issue. Nor does the Children's Convention, via its Committee,
stand alone in designating the punishment to be a human rights
violation. Paragraphs 22-25 of General Comment No. 8414 present a
lawyerly recitation of those other human rights treaties that roundly
condemn, via their respective monitoring committees, this disciplinary
tactic regardless of where or how it is employed or who the punisher
may be.415
414. Children's Committee General Comment No. 8, supra note 384, J 22-25.
415. Paragraphs 22 through 25 of Children's Committee General Comment No. 8 provide as
follows:
22. The Committee emphasizes that eliminating violent and humiliating punishment of
children, through law reform and other necessary measures, is an immediate and
unqualified obligation of States parties. It notes that other treaty bodies, including the
Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the Committee Against Torture have reflected the same view in their concluding
observations on States parties' reports under the relevant instruments, recommending
prohibition and other measures against corporal punishment in schools, penal systems
and, in some cases, the family. For example, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, in its general comment No. 13 (1999) on "The right to education" stated:
"In the Committee's view, corporal punishment is inconsistent with the fundamental
guiding principle of international human rights law enshrined in the Preambles to the
Universal Declaration and both Covenants: the dignity of the individual .. "
23. Corporal punishment has also been condemned by regional human rights
mechanisms. The European Court of Human Rights, in a series of judgements, has
progressively condemned corporal punishment of children, first in the penal system, then
in schools, including private schools, and most recently in the home. The European
Committee of Social Rights, monitoring compliance of member States of the Council of
Europe with the European Social Charter and Revised Social Charter, has found that
compliance with the Charters requires prohibition in legislation against any form of
violence against children, whether at school, in other institutions, in their home or
elsewhere.
24. An Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, on the Legal
Status and Human Rights of the Child (2002) holds that the States parties to the American
Convention on Human Rights "are under the obligation.., to adopt all positive measures
required to ensure protection of children against mistreatment, whether in their relations
with public authorities, or in relations among individuals or with non-governmental
entities." The Court quotes provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
conclusions of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and also judgements of the
European Court of Human Rights relating to States' obligations to protect children from
violence, including within the family. The Court concludes that "the State has the duty to
adopt positive measures to fully ensure effective exercise of the rights of the child."
25. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights monitors implementation of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In a 2003 decision on an individual
communication concerning a sentence of "lashes" imposed on students, the Commission
found that the punishment violated article 5 of the African Charter, which prohibits cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment. It requested the relevant Government to amend the
law, abolishing the penalty of lashes, and to take appropriate measures to ensure
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It is worth identifying some of the other treaties to which General
Comment No. 8 refers; 416 even a cursory review of them manifests that
the international community's recognition of corporal punishment of
children as a human rights violation is ubiquitous. An implicit absolute
ban on the punishment exists in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 417 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights,418 and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.419 This is by no means
an exhaustive list.
420
It should be clarified that, though the United States has ratified some
of the above-named treaties and not others,421 its status as a state party is
compensation of the victims. In its decision, the Commission states: "There is no right for
individuals, and particularly the Government of a country to apply physical violence to
individuals for offences. Such a right would be tantamount to sanctioning State-
sponsored torture under the Charter and contrary to the very nature of this human rights
treaty." The Committee on the Rights of the Child is pleased to note that constitutional
and other high-level courts in many countries have issued decisions condemning corporal
punishment of children in some or all settings, and in most cases quoting the Convention
on the Rights of the Child.
Id. 22-25 (internal footnotes omitted).
416. Children's Committee General Comment No. 8, supra note 384, 22-25.
417. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316.
For a detailed and fully supported analysis of this Covenant's provisions which have been
interpreted to ban corporal punishment of children, see BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 76-78, 80-81, 95-
97, 99, 102, 107-08.
418. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A/6316.
For a thorough and fully supported analysis of this Covenant's provisions which have been
interpreted to proscribe corporal punishment of children, see BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 76-78, 112-
15.
419. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec.
10, 1984).
For an extended and fully documented analysis of this Convention's provisions which have
been construed to forbid corporal punishment of children, see BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 76-78, 80-
87.
420. See, e.g., European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 31; American
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; European Social Charter, Oct. 18,
1961, 519 U.N.T.S. 89; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
For analyses of how each of the above-mentioned treaties interdicts corporal punishment of
children, see BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 76-81, 87-95, 98-99, 101-12.
421. Of the human rights treaties referred to in the text above, the United States has ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. See University of Minnesota Human Rights
Library, Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties-USA, http://wwwl.unm.edu/humanrts/res
earch/ratification-USA.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (showing U.S. ratification of the Covenant and of
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
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irrelevant for purposes of this Article. These treaties are, rather, invoked
as evidence of international legal norms and, therefore, of modem
standards of decency on school corporal punishment, in keeping with the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of Atkins, Roper, and earlier Supreme
Court precedents.422
A survey of the domestic laws of other countries is of a piece with
international human rights laws prohibiting this punishment. As of this
writing, twenty-four nations have completely barred all corporal
punishment of children, regardless of who dispenses it, how lightly or in
what venue. 423 The pace of this abolitionism has been rapidly
accelerating since 1995, as the following graph424 illustrates:
30 - _
25- 24
20 _____
C
0 15__ _
Z 10 -12
5
5 ________ _,_
0 _._...____-.__---__
0
1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007
One hundred and three nations presently completely bar corporal
punishment of children in the schools, a solid majority of the world's
countries. 425 Embarrassingly, that figure includes all of the major
industrialized democracies except areas of Australia and twenty-two
states in the United States.426 Because the U.S. Supreme Court, in
previous Eighth Amendment cases, has been exceedingly sensitive to
422. See supra notes 165, 213, 254 and accompanying text.
423. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, http://www.endcorporalpunis
hment.org/pages/frame.html (follow "Countdown to universal prohibition" hyperlink) (last visited July
14,2008).
424. Id.
425. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, http://www.endcorporalpunish
ment.org/pages/frame.html (follow "Online global table: legality of corporal punishment" hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
426. Id.
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laws and customs of the United Kingdom as evincing modem standards
of decency,427 it is no minor thing that school corporal punishment is
illegal in that country as well.
428
The international concordance against school corporal punishment
appears, on balance, to be on a par with the Atkins Court's summation
that "within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty
for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved., 429 In Roper, however, the Court had before it even more
evidence of an international consensus abhorring the juvenile death
penalty than currently prevails against corporal punishment of
schoolchildren. 430 The Roper Court additionally could find reassurance
in the fact that there are indisputably express treaty provisions banning
the juvenile death penalty.431 And, in Roper, the Court was placed in the
unpalatable position of taking cognizance that, by 2005, the United
States was the only country in the world that officially sanctioned the
juvenile death penalty.432
At first glance, the showing of an international consensus against the
juvenile death penalty in Roper appears stronger than the international
denunciation of school corporal punishment. But, a less superficial
examination reveals the difference, in the final analysis, to be
insubstantial. To recapitulate, there is a plethora of authoritative
interpretations that the ordinary meanings of multiple omnibus terms, in
multiple treaties, embrace a prohibition on corporal punishment of
children, including that dispensed in the schools. 4 33 These interpretations
have been accepted by a growing number of international law scholars
who have reiterated the substance of them and thereby facilitated their
ongoing elevation into hard law.434 Finally, although the United States is
certainly not the only country in the world where some school corporal
punishment is still lawful, it is absonant in a minority that cannot boast a
single other democratic world-class power.435 This said, it should be
noted that the Supreme Court has often posited that a punishment's legal
rank in the international arena does not control the Eighth Amendment's
427. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
428. Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, http://www.endcorporalpunis
hment.org/pages/frame.html (follow "Countdown to universal prohibition" hyperlink, then follow
"online global table" hyperlink, then follow "TABLE U-Z" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
429. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
430. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
431. Id. at 576.
432. Id. at 575.
433. See supra notes 384-86 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 402-04 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 423-28 and accompanying text.
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evolution; it is, rather, merely a guide-the proverbial lodestar lighting
the way.436
That school corporal punishment is anathema under international
human rights law and the domestic laws of a majority of nations,
including the United Kingdom, 437 is an eloquent testament to modem
standards of decency under the measures employed in Atkins and Roper.
When combined with the overwhelming American consensus against
school corporal punishment, 438 the Court should find that modem
standards of decency and corporal punishment of public schoolchildren
are irreconcilable and mutually exclusive phenomena.
b. Application of the Third Criterion
That leaves the last analytical hurdle-the third criterion-under
Eighth Amendment doctrine: the Court must bring to bear its own
independent judgment on whether school corporal punishment passes
muster under the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause.439 It is, frankly, not immediately obvious how the Court should
proceed. When the Court brought its independent judgment to bear in
Atkins, Roper, and Kennedy,440 it was not charting new territory
inasmuch as the Justices had done the same in earlier death penalty
cases.441 But, there is no similar line of school corporal punishment
cases which previously tasked the Court in this manner. Ingraham
foreclosed the development of such precedent.
442
Nevertheless, because public school corporal punishment and the
death penalty are both variants of governmentally administered bodily
punishment,44 3 the features of which call for similar Eighth Amendment
treatment, the Court's exercise of its separate judgment in Atkins, Roper,
and Kennedy should logically afford an adaptable paradigm in the same
436. E.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
437. See supra notes 425-28 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 313-14, 366-72 and accompanying text.
439. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2657-65 (2008), reh'g denied 129 S. Ct. 1 (2008);
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312-13 (2002); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-89.
440. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2657-65; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 568-75; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312-13,
318-21.
441. E.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788-89, 797-801; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-600
(1977) (plurality opinion).
442. It will be recalled that the Ingraham Court precluded the development of any precedents on
how the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applies to public school corporal punishment, by
holding that the Clause cannot ever apply to such punishment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671
(1977).
443. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
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way that the trilogy's analysis of standards of decency does. 4 4 4 In the
alternative or as a supplement to the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy paradigm,
Trop v. Dulles44 5 suggests another possible approach to exercising
independent judicial discretion. This approach may be particularly
attractive because Trop does not involve the death penalty, but, instead,
turns on the constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment of a
punishment, like school paddling, dispensed outside of the criminal
justice system.446
It should be recalled that the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy paradigm
requires the Justices to answer certain inquiries constitutive to
determining whether the challenged punishment is proportional to the
crime.4 47 Does inflicting the death penalty on a designated cohort serve
the penalty's judicially recognized social purposes of deterrence,
retribution, or both?448 Does the designated cohort have reduced
capacity or culpability?449 And, do cohort members face a special risk of
wrongful execution? 450 If the Court answers at least the first question in
the affirmative, then it probably should adjudge the punishment to
infringe the Amendment,45' regardless of anyone else's views on the
subject.
The approach laid out in Trop v. Dulles to exercising independent
judicial judgment is more nebulous than the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy
model. 452  Trop was an Eighth Amendment action against the
congressionally decreed punishment of denaturalization imposed on one
who had already served a judicial sentence. 453 The Justices in Trop had,
on the one hand, not yet self-consciously fashioned a distinctly unique
role for themselves in deciding which punishments overstep the
Amendment, apart from objective indicia of modern standards of
444. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
445. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
446. Id. at 88 (describing the punishment in issue as a congressionally authorized loss of U.S.
citizenship, subsequent to conviction and sentencing by a court).
447. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
448. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2658-59, 2661-62 (2008), reh'g denied 129 S. Ct. 1
(2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20
(2002).
449, Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-74; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
450. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2662-64; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572-74; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21.
451. In the trilogy cases, the Court has always asked and answered the first of the three questions
set forth in the text above. See Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2661-62; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72; Atkins, 536
U.S. at 318-20. Whether the Court inquires into either of the other two questions set forth in the text
above has depended on whether the circumstances of a particular suit make the question probative on the
proportionality issue. See, e.g., Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2645-65 (failing to discuss whether child rapists
have reduced capacity or culpability).
452. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-104 (1958) (plurality opinion).
453. Id. at 88.
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decency. 454  On the other hand, the Trop plurality concomitantly
conveyed the hazy notion that the courts could not decide cases under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause by the simple expedient of
unthinkingly bowing to modem standards of decency; indeed, the
opinion for the Court provides an extended discussion as to why its
authors found the challenged denaturalization to violate the Clause, a
discussion preceding and discrete from the Court's excursus on modem
standards of decency. 455 The Justices explained that, to their way of
thinking, denaturalization results in "the total destruction of the
individual's status in organized society ' 456 and divests him or her of "the
right to have rights." 457 They elaborated that these repercussions
rendered denaturalization an affront to the dignity of man, 458 a core
concept animating the Eighth Amendment. 459 The Trop Court may be
said to have, in effect, created a "dignity of man" standard to inform its
own judgment on whether such denaturalization sank to the level of
cruel and unusual punishments.460 The Court has subsequently, though
unpredictably and with varying degrees of emphasis, recurred to this
standard in bringing its unadorned judgment to bear under the
Amendment, sometimes in tandem with proportionality analysis.
461
454. Id. at 99-104 (setting forth the relevant analysis under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause without distinguishing a unique role for the Court apart from assessing objective evidence that
the contested punishment is an affront to human dignity); see Matthew E. Albers, Note, Legislative
Deference in Eighth Amendment Capital Sentencing Challenges: The Constitutional Inadequacy of the
Current Judicial Approach, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 467, 470-72, 487-89, 497-500 (1999)
(describing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), as the first case where the Court devised a test
allocating to itself independent judgment, beyond consensus review, as to whether the penalty in a given
context violates the Eighth Amendment).
455. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99-102.
456. Id. at 101.
457. Id. at 102.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 100; see Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 772-78 (2006) (pointing to the many Eighth Amendment cases in
which the Court has paid homage to human dignity as integral to the Amendment's meaning, but
criticizing the Court for only paying lip service to the concept); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk,
Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1921, 1935 (2003) (averring that human dignity has been at the heart of the Eighth Amendment's
protections).
460. See Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less than the Dignity of Man: Evolving Standards,
Botched Executions and Utah's Controversial Use of the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 375-
76, 412 & n.432 (2002-2003) (describing Trop's focus on human dignity under the Eighth
Amendment); Resnik & Chi-hye Suk, supra note 459, at 1935 (commenting that Trop made the dignity
of man a basic tenet of the Eighth Amendment); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Note, Creatures, Persons, and
Prisoners: Evaluating Prison Conditions Under the Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1116-
17, 1124 (1982) (referring to "the Trop v. Dulles dignity test").
461. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 578 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
311 (2002); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
HeinOnline -- 77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1394 2008-2009
2009] SCHOOL CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 1395
It is the thesis of this Article that in determining to its own
satisfaction whether public school corporal punishment contravenes the
Clause, the Court should use either the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy paradigm,
the Trop standard, or a combination thereof. Selecting from among these
three possibilities would be sufficiently consistent with stare decisis and,
for the reasons stated below, eminently practicable and jurisprudentially
fruitful. 462 It is submitted that under any of the three the Court should,
based on the most recent reliable scientific evidence463 as well as
philosophical scruples about corporal punishment of children,464
invalidate the punishment in the public schools. This Article contends
that, in fact, there is no conceivable standard which would enable the
Court to independently find this punishment within the Eighth
Amendment's compass.
It should be acknowledged that there is a dearth of scientific studies
directly examining the effects of school corporal punishment on
children.465  This lacuna, however, is substantially bridged by
psychologists' clinical observations of 4 6 6 and theoretical work on such
effects,467 by scientific studies indirectly testing for such effects, 468 and
462. See infra notes 463-562 and accompanying text.
463. See infra notes 465-98 and accompanying text.
464. See infra notes 534-62 and accompanying text.
465. See Norma D. Feshbach & Seymour Feshbach, Aggression in the Schools: Toward Reducing
Ethnic Conflict and Enhancing Ethnic Understanding, in VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY
AND THE COMMUNITY 269, 274 (Penelope K. Trickett & Cynthia J. Schellenbach eds., 1998); Stephen S.
Owen, The Relationship Between Social Capital and Corporal Punishment in Schools: A Theoretical
Inquiry, 37 YOUTH & Soc'y 85, 88 (2005); Melissa J. Spencer, Corporal Punishment and Ridicule-
Residual Psychological Effects in Early Adulthood: Implications for Counselors 13 (1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Tech University).
466. E.g., Irwin A. Hyman, Using Research to Change Public Policy: Reflections on 20 Years of
Effort to Eliminate Corporal Punishment in Schools, 98 PEDIATRICS 818, 818 (1996) [hereinafter
Hyman, Reflections]; cf Telephone Interview with Dr. Milton V. Kline, Clinical Psychologist (May 25,
2002) (recounting patients' adverse psychological reactions to corporal punishment which they
underwent as children in unspecified settings).
467. E.g., HYMAN, HICKORY STICK, supra note 134, at 1-127; Owen, supra note 465 at 87-88
(suggesting that school corporal punishment is a factor inducing psychological injury in those who were
so punished); cf PHILIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISHMENT AND THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE passim (1991) (theorizing as to corporal punishment's
negative effects on children in a variety of contexts).
468. E.g., J. Csorba et al., Family- and School-Related Stresses in Depressed Hungarian Children,
16 EuR. PSYCHIATRY 18, 25 (2001) (finding that an association exists between school corporal
punishment and subsequent child depression); Maria R. Czumbil & Irwin A. Hyman, What Happens
when Corporal Punishment Is Legal?, 12 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 309, 312 (1997) (relying upon
newspaper reports of school corporal punishment to deduce that abusiveness of such punishment
increases with the frequency of its use); Daniel J. Flannery et al., Violence Exposure, Psychological
Trauma, and Suicide Risk in a Community Sample ofDangerously Violent Adolescents, 40 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 435, 440 (2001) (publishing results of a correlational study of
children subjected to violence "in the home, neighborhood, and school"); Society for Adolescent
Medicine, supra note 32, at 388 (reporting on studies showing that school corporal punishment creates
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by the recent proliferation of scientific studies concerning the effects of
parental corporal punishment,469 some of which can legitimately be
extrapolated to the school setting.
470
The anecdotal and theoretical literature in the psychology field is,
without mincing words, almost totally damning of school corporal
an educational environment which is "unproductive" and "nullifying" and which has negative
psychological impacts on pupils); cf Harriet L. MacMillan et al., Slapping and Spanking in Childhood
and Its Association with Lifetime Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders in a General Population Sample,
161 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 805, 809 (1999) (presenting the results of a cross-sectional study of corporal
punishment of children dispensed by "any adult").
469. E.g., Julie L. Crouch & Leah E. Behl, Relationships Among Parental Beliefs in Corporal
Punishment, Reported Stress, and Physical Child Abuse Potential, 25 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 413,
417 (2001) (demonstrating that parental corporal punishment of children is often the prelude to severe
physical child abuse); Heather L. Bender et al., Use of Harsh Physical Discipline and Developmental
Outcomes in Adolescence, 19 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 227, 238-41 (2007) (finding parental
corporal punishment to be correlated with children's ensuing deteriorating mental health); Elizabeth
Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child Behaviors and
Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539, 543-44 (2002)
[hereinafter Gershoff, Meta-Analytic Review] (finding that parental corporal punishment is associated
with at least ten negative outcomes for the recipients: decreased moral internalization, increased child
aggression, increased child delinquent and antisocial conduct, decreased quality of the parent-child
relationship, decreased child mental health, and increased risk of undergoing classic physical child
abuse, and upon reaching adulthood, increased adult aggression, increased adult criminal and antisocial
behavior, decreased adult mental health, and increased risk of abusing one's own child or spouse);
Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment, Physical Abuse, and the Burden of Proof" Reply
to Baumrind, Larzelere and Cowan (2002), Holden (2002), and Parke (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL.
602, 609 (2002) (observing that the "current state of the field" is that at worst parental corporal
punishment may have destructive consequences for children and at best no effect whatsoever); Joseph
T.F. Lau et al., The Relationship Between Physical Maltreatment and Substance Use Among
Adolescents: A Survey of 95, 788 Adolescents in Hong Kong, 37 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 110, 111, 115-
18 (2005) (finding an association between parental corporal punishment and later alcohol and drug use
in the children hit); N. L. Lopez et al., Parental Disciplinary History, Current Levels of Empathy, and
Moral Reasoning in Young Adults, 3 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 193, 200-01 (2001) (concluding that young
adults who had been subject to minor use of corporal punishment were apt to have low levels of
empathy); Prahbhjot Malhi & Munni Ray, Prevalence and Correlates of Corporal Punishment Among
Adolescents, 46 STUDIA PSYCHOLOGIA 219, 224-25 (2004) (discovering that adolescents whose parents
corporally punished them had lower overall adjustment, especially at home and school); Elizabeth A.
Stormshak et al., Parenting Practices and Child Disruptive Behavior Problems in Early Elementary
School, 29 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 17, 18, 26 (2000) (reporting that parental spanking is correlated
with aggressive child behavior); Zvi Strassberg et al., Spanking in the Home and Children's Subsequent
Aggression Toward Kindergarten Peers, 6 DEv. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 445, 456-59 (1994) (showing
that parental corporal punishment contributes to aggression in children regardless of the frequency of the
punishment); Murray A. Straus, New Evidence for the Benefits of Never Spanking, 38 SOC'Y 52, 54-55
(2001) (analyzing that parental corporal punishment is correlated with increased childhood antisocial
behavior, increased probability of corporally punished children assaulting parents, and increased
likelihood that corporally punished boys will later assault a girlfriend).
470. E-mail from Dr. Elizabeth Gershoff, Assistant Professor, School of Social Work, University
of Michigan, to Susan H. Bitensky, Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law (Sept.
1, 2004) (on file with author); see Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 389-90 (noting
that Gershoff's meta-analyses are a basis for admonishing teachers to refrain from corporally punishing
students).
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punishment. 471 The explanation for this lies in the experts' determination
that school corporal punishment has only one fleeting positive effect
while giving rise to a host of potential negative effects. The sole positive
outcome of hitting a child for disciplinary purposes is that he or she will
probably cease misbehaving.472 This, without more, would seem to
counsel putting a paddle in every classroom, front and center and near at
hand. But, as usual, the devil is in the details. It turns out that the
cessation of misbehavior is ephemeral and teaches the child nothing of
lasting import.473 Some experts have theorized that the only reason a
child, upon being spanked, stops misbehaving at all is that he or she is
momentarily outraged.474  It appears that corporal punishment
accomplishes little except, perhaps, to give a weary and exasperated
adult an opportunity to vent or to provide a short respite from a child's
trying conduct.475 While it is perfectly understandable that an adult
attempting to manage an unruly child may need to let off steam or take a
break, these are not disciplinary goals. This "positive" outcome is of
extremely dubious, if not fanciful, value.
On the other side of the equation, corporal punishment risks harming
children in so many serious ways as to sink the scales against the rod to
bathyal depths. It is no surprise to learn that striking a child may easily
result in physical injuries such as abrasions and hematomas.476 There
have also been reports of whiplash,477 sciatic nerve damage,478 fracture
471. E.g., Hyman, Reflections, supra note 466, at 818; Owen, supra note 465, at 87-88; cf Kline,
supra note 466 (advising that childhood corporal punishment in unspecified venues caused fear of
contact sports in some people).
472. Carolyn Hilarski, Corporal Punishment: Another Form of School Violence, in KIDS AND
VIOLENCE: THE INVISIBLE SCHOOL EXPERIENCE 59, 71 (Catherine N. Dulmus & Karen M. Sowers eds.,
2004); Irwin A. Hyman et al., Paddling and Pro-Paddling Polemics: Refuting Nineteenth Century
Pedagogy, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 74, 79 (2002); Hyman, Reflections, supra note 466, at 820.
473. Hyman et al., supra note 472, at 79; Hyman, Reflections, supra note 466, at 820.
474. Cf SEARS & SEARS, supra note 30, at 150 (describing the child's incensed feelings upon
being hit by a parent as motivating temporary cessation of misbehavior); SAL SEVERE, HOW TO BEHAVE
SO YOUR CHILDREN WILL, Too! 139 (2000) (surmising that the child temporarily halts his or her
misconduct, when hit by a parent, due to anger).
475. BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 2; MICHAEL J. MARSHALL, WHY SPANKING DOESN'T WORK:
STOPPING THIS BAD HABIT AND GETTING THE UPPER HAND ON EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE 107-09 (2002);
Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 389.
476. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 (1977) (adverting to the fact that school
paddling of one of the petitioners caused a hematoma); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1299-1300, 1304
(9th Cir. 1996) (ruling that a high school principal violated students' substantive due process rights in
using corporal punishment on them which produced bruising, among other harms); Society for
Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 389 (noting that reported medical findings of the injuries caused
by school corporal punishment include hematomas and abrasions).
477. Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 389.
478. Spencer, supra note 465, at47.
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of the sacrum, 479 and hemorrhaging, 480 to name just a few of the more
alarming physical injuries suffered by corporally punished children.
Damage possibly to life and not infrequently to limb or skin,
however, only begins to tell the tale. School corporal punishment is also
correlated with increased childhood depression, 481 increased childhood
aggression,482 increased likelihood of childhood posttraumatic stress
disorder,483 decreased childhood self-esteem, 484 and reduced childhood
self-control. 485 Nor is this an exhaustive list.
486
Although parental corporal punishment is outside the scope of this
Article, its effects on children are not. That is because the effects are
thought to be largely reproduced by school corporal punishment4 87 and
because parental corporal punishment, unlike school paddling, has been
subject to considerable rigorous scientific study.488 A 2002 ground
breaking meta-analytic review, covering eighty-eight studies conducted
from 1938 to 2000, concerns links between parental corporal
punishment and ensuing behaviors and syndromes in the punished
children. 489 The review establishes that parental physical punishment is
associated with the following negative psychological and educational
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. IRWIN A. HYMAN & PAMELA A. SNOOK, DANGEROUS SCHOOLS: WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT
THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL ABUSE OF OUR CHILDREN 48 (1999); Hilarski, supra note 472, at 61;
Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 388; but see Spencer, supra note 465, at 131
(claiming no connection exists between school corporal punishment and student depression).
482. HYMAN & SNOOK, supra note 481, at 48; Anthony F. Bongiovanni, An Analysis of Research
on Punishment and Its Relation to the Use of Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 351, 365-66 (Irwin A. Hyman & James H. Wise eds., 1979);
Hilarski, supra note 472, at 61; Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 388.
483. Spencer, supra note 465, at 49, 52; Owen, supra note 465, at 88; Society for Adolescent
Medicine, supra note 32, at 388.
484. HYMAN & SNOOK, supra note 481, at 48; Hyman et al., supra note 472, at 79; Hyman,
Reflections, supra note 466, at 819; Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 388-89.
485. Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 388.
486. For more detailed discussions of the range of undesirable repercussions of school corporal
punishment in general for students, see, for example: BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 1-28; Sarah E. Fine et
al., Anger Perception, Caregivers' Use of Physical Discipline, and Aggression in Children at Risk, 13
SOC. DEV. 213, 224 (2004); Gershoff, Meta-Analytic Review, supra note 469, at 543-44; Scott D. Gest
et al., Shared Book Reading and Children's Language Comprehension Skills: The Moderating Role of
Parental Discipline Practices, 19 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 319, 332 (2004). For further works
zeroing in on additional adverse effects of school corporal punishment in particular, see Abraham A.
Andero & Allen Stewart, Issue of Corporal Punishment: Re-Examined, 29 J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL.
90, 94 (2002), and George G. Bear et al, Children's Reasoning About Aggression: Differences Between
Japan and the United States and Implications for School Discipline, 35 SCH. PSYCHOL. REV. 62, 63-64
(2006).
487. See supra notes 469-70 and accompanying text.
488. See id.
489. Gershoff, Meta-Analytic Review, supra note 469, at 543-44.
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outcomes: decreased moral internalization, increased child delinquent
and antisocial conduct, decreased quality of the parent-child
relationship, decreased child mental health, and increased risk of
undergoing classic physical child abuse, and, upon reaching adulthood,
increased adult aggression, increased adult criminal and antisocial
behavior, decreased adult mental health, and increased risk of abusing
one's own child or spouse.49°
Several aspects of these data merit neon highlighting. In an era when
schools in the United States are sporadically scenes of devastating gun
violence perpetrated by students,4  the heightened childhood aggression
and antisocial behavior that may also be spurred by school corporal
punishment should rivet our undivided attention. The dynamic by which
hitting children may make them more aggressive or delinquent is subject
to conjecture, but many experts offer the common sense explanation that
adult physical chastisement of youngsters models violent problem-
solving.492 When that chastisement is meted out in an educational
institution by an educator, there is a "lesson" that is learned and it is
quite contrary to any sane pedagogical aim. Furthermore, school
corporal punishment may actually impair rather than foster the child's
development of a conscience, a central objective of all child
discipline. 493 It is the child's inner controls that keep him or her out of
mischief when adults are not present and that eventually grows the
moral backbone to sustain an honorable adulthood.
It should, for accuracy's sake, be underscored that the data prove that
parental corporal punishment of children is correlated with the above-
490. Id. For more recent studies with one or more findings consistent with those listed by
Professor Gershoff, see for example: Tracie 0. Afifi et al., Physical Punishment, Childhood Abuse and
Psychiatric Disorders, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1093, 1094, 1099 (2006); Bender et al., supra note
469, at 238-41; Andrew Grogan-Kaylor, Corporal Punishment and the Growth Trajectory of Children's
Antisocial Behavior, 10 CHILD MALTREATMENT 283, 290-91 (2005); but see Elizabeth Oddone
Paolucci & Claudio Violato, A Meta-Analysis of the Published Research on the Affective, Cognitive, and
Behavioral Effects of Corporal Punishment, 138 J. PSYCHOL. 197, 214-15 (2004) (demonstrating that
parental corporal punishment carries only "a small, and perhaps negligible, increased risk" of resulting
in children's emotional and behavioral problems).
491. See Editorial, A Mass Shooting at School, Yet Again, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Apr.
17, 2007, at A20; but see Joseph Gasper, Editorial, Dispelling Myths About School Shootings in
Aftermath of Massacre, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 19, 2007, at 15A (averring that over the preceding
decade, school shootings have decreased).
492. HYMAN & SNOOK, supra note 481, at 48; Jaana Haapasalo & Elina Pokela, Child-Rearing
and Child Abuse Antecedents of Criminality, 4 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 107, 118 (1999);
Murray A. Straus, Spanking and the Making of a Violent Society, 98 PEDIATRICS 837, 839 (1996).
493. Gershoff, Meta-Analytic Review, supra note 469, at 543-44; see Society for Adolescent
Medicine, supra note 32, at 388 (positing that school corporal punishment of children sends "the wrong
message, one of avoidance ... from getting caught"); cf. Bear et al., supra note 486, at 63-64 (observing
that punitive discipline of schoolchildren tends to foster a "hedonistic perspective" rather than moral
reasoning).
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described adverse impacts; the data do not show that such punishment
causes these impacts. In other words, the experts know that some
children who are corporally punished will be adversely affected by it,
but that other similarly situated children who cannot be identified in
advance, will emerge from the punishment unscathed.494 One could,
therefore, imagine skeptics charging that this lack of predictability
disables any claim that corporal punishment damages children with
sufficient regularity or in large enough numbers to outweigh even its
negligible efficacy.
The response to such criticism is that where adults or persons of all
ages are in an analogous predicament, i.e., where their risk is
unpredictable and imprecise, the government, private industry, and the
medical profession are quick to formulate policy against or remove the
source of the risk.495 There is no reason why children should not be
entitled to the same solicitousness if they alone are put at risk. Two
examples should suffice to dramatize the proposition. Several years ago,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advised against ingestion
of Baycol, an anticholesterol medication, due to strong but inconclusive
evidence of noxious side effects.49 6 The agency approved of the
manufacturer's withdrawal of Baycol from the American market, in
spite of the inconclusive evidence, because there were other anti-
cholesterol drugs available that did not have these side effects. 497 One
would hope that the FDA's approach of barring Baycol would be
equally applicable to spanking children, assuming that policymakers
have as much regard for children as they do for adults with elevated
cholesterol. Another apt parallel concerns smoking. Not everyone who
smokes will get cancer or other life-threatening illnesses, but the fact
that some smokers will be stricken is enough to make physicians
494. For an extended discussion about the fact that most relevant studies show only correlative
rather than causative relationships between corporal punishment of children and the behavioral and
psychological outcomes for those children, see BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 10, 11 & nn.55, 59. Indeed,
experts purposefully shun experimental (causative) studies of spanking children because of ethical
concerns about subjecting children to physical pain when there is no established benefit from doing so.
E-mail from Dr. Joan Durrant, Associate Professor, Head of Family Studies, University of Manitoba, to
Susan Bitensky, Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law (Oct. 9, 2002) (on file
with author).
495. See, e.g., U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Plenylpropanolamine Information Page,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/ppa (last visited Nov. 7, 2008); Tobaccodocuments.org, http://to
baccodocuments.org/profiles/ama.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2008); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA
TALK PAPER: BAYER VOLUNTARY WITHDRAWS BAYCOL (Aug. 8, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topic
s/ANSWERS/2001/ANS01095.html.
496. See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 495. The analogy of corporal punishment to
Baycol was developed by Professor Murray A. Straus.
497. Id.
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discourage all of their patients from lighting up.4 9 8 Again, one would
hope that policymakers would care enough for children, who after all do
not paddle themselves, as for adults and adolescents who, voluntarily
and with fair warning, take up smoking.
If the Court were to apply the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy paradigm in
exercising its independent judgment on the constitutionality of school
corporal punishment under the Eighth Amendment, it would be
incumbent upon the Court to apply the foregoing data in answering the
three inquiries comprising proportionality review.499 With respect to the
first inquiry as to whether school corporal punishment serves the
penological or social purposes of deterrence or retribution, 00 the paddle
is no better off, constitutionally speaking, than the death penalty for the
mentally retarded, juveniles, or child rapists. There is no published
scientific evidence that paddling deters the unpaddled from mimicking
other students' disobedience. In fact, the evidence is all the other way;
statistics show that schools which relinquish corporal punishment
experience no rise in student misconduct. 50 1 Conversely, states which
continue to retain legalized school corporal punishment also happen to
be the states that experience the highest incidence of school shooting
fatalities.5 10 2 It is thought, too, that spanking students destroys rather than
preserves a classroom atmosphere conducive to the learning process. 50 3
From a more individualistic and less institutional perspective, it appears
that corporal punishment may interfere with children's cognitive
development, 50 4 and that even watching corporal punishment of other
498. See Tobaccodocuments.org, supra note 495. To my knowledge, the analogy of corporal
punishment of children to cigarette smoking was first drawn by Professor Murray A. Straus.
499. See supra notes 311, 444, 447, 451 and accompanying text.
500. See id.
501. Hyman, Reflections, supra note 466, at 820; Irwin A. Hyman & Pamela A. Snook,
Dangerous Schools and What You Can Do About Them, 81 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 488, 489 (2000);
Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 388.
502. Doreen Arcus, School Shooting Fatalities and School Corporal Punishment: A Look at the
States, 28 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 173, 180-82 (2002); see also Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra
note 32, at 389 (indicating that some research shows that the more corporal punishment is used in
schools, the higher is the rate of student violence).
503. Society for Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 388 (stating that school corporal
punishment introduces "trepidation... [and a lost] sense of confidence and security" in the classroom,
such that even children who only witness others being paddled "are robbed of their full leaming
potential"); see Bear et al., supra note 486, at 64 (reporting that supportive relations between teachers
and students, as opposed to the antagonism to which punitiveness contributes, enhances the latter's
academic prowess); cf Andero & Stewart, supra note 486, at 94 (pointing out that school corporal
punishment may inspire tardiness, truancy, or dropping out of school, undermining "the very basic
principle of education which is you cannot educate an absent child").
504. See HYMAN, HICKORY STICK, supra note 134, at 96, 99 (stating that approximately seventy
percent of those students with traumatic stress symptoms related to having been corporally punished at
school, have problems with academic performance); Straus, supra note 469, 55-56 (offering evidence
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children may be deeply disturbing so as to induce child witnesses to
experience their own adverse psychological reactions. 50 5 Under these
circumstances, there is plenty of detriment to students but no discernible
deterrence of misbehavior.
The social purpose of retribution does not travel well from the
gallows to the schoolhouse. Retribution against noncompliant students
should have no place in a modem elementary or secondary school.
Educators, even when in disciplinary mode, should be educating, not
taking vengeance. Avenging a student's misdeeds is not a pedagogical
purpose.
506
The second inquiry, as to whether the recipients of a punishment are
of diminished capacity or culpability when they are children, has already
been answered by the Court in Roper v. Simmons.50 7 In pursuing an
Eighth Amendment proportionality review of the juvenile death penalty,
Roper ruled that children are, by their very nature, beings of diminished
culpability in comparison to normal adults.50 8 The Court relied upon
scientific and sociological studies to identify those facets of children's
nature which produce this phenomenon.50 9 The facets, wrote the Court,
are that children, generally speaking, have an "underdeveloped sense of
responsibility," often leading them into reckless behaviors; 510 they have
a heightened susceptibility to negative outside influences such as
unwholesome peer pressure;511 and their characters are not fixed, but
rather, more of a work in progress.
512
Of course, these traits are present in children whether they are facing
the death penalty or school corporal punishment. The traits' significance
in the former situation is that, when children commit crimes, reduced
culpability makes the death penalty a disproportionate punishment for
that corporal punishment of young children may weaken the foundations for cognitive development so
that these children will continue to have difficulties with cognitive skills later in childhood).
505. See HYMAN, HICKORY STICK, supra note 134, at 78-79 (theorizing that a child's witnessing
of school corporal punishment may lead to his or her development of stress disorders); Society for
Adolescent Medicine, supra note 32, at 388 (claiming that child witnesses of school corporal
punishment "are robbed of their full learning potential").
506. RONALD G. MORRISH, WITH ALL DUE RESPECT: KEYS FOR BUILDING EFFECTIVE SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE 63 (2000); see THOMAS LICKONA, EDUCATING FOR CHARACTER: How OUR SCHOOLS CAN
TEACH RESPECT AND RESPONSIBILITY 110-11, 131 (1991) (arguing for schools to use "moral
discipline" that does not rely extensively on external controls or punitiveness).
507. 543 U.S. 551, 569-72 (2005).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 569-70.
510. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
511. Id.
512. Id. at 570.
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this type of perpetrator.513 The traits' significance in the latter situation
is most apparent when corporal punishment's adverse effects on children
are taken into account in light of the Roper Court's concern for giving
children the opportunity to mature and profit from rehabilitation
efforts. 514 It should be recollected that some of the adverse effects of
paddling recited above are seriously damaging to personality
development and may persist when the punished child reaches
adulthood. 515 Hence, these effects may not only mar the quality of life
during childhood, but may also warp child development irretrievably so
that the child is thwarted from fulfilling his or her potential, emotionally
or intellectually. 516 The constitutional dimensions of this dynamic are
brought to the fore by the Roper Justices' desideratum that the state must
not destroy the child's "potential to attain a mature understanding of his
[or her] own humanity." 517 Although this principle was enunciated with
respect to the juvenile death penalty, it should be just as applicable to the
hobbling psychological outcomes of school corporal punishment.
Respecting the third inquiry, whether schoolchildren are in peril of
being wrongfully corporally punished, the data about the punishment's
negative effects can give rise to only one inference. If, and it was
previously shown to be so, corporal punishment accomplishes no real,
defensible purpose,518 but does have a range of heinous impacts on some
children,519 then punishing students in this way is a wrong, and a cruel
one at that. The wrong is aggravated by the fact that school personnel
may resort to an array of nonviolent techniques for disciplining children
which do not appear to threaten the latter's well-being but which are
more effective than corporal punishment. 520 These techniques include
513. Id. at571-75.
514. Id. at573-74.
515. See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
516. See id.
517. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
518. See supra notes 500-06 and accompanying text.
519. See supra notes 476-90 and accompanying text.
520. BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 2-3; IRWIN A. HYMAN ET AL., SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND
SCHOOL VIOLENCE: THE TEACHER VARIANCE APPROACH 18, 47-48 (1997) (moral education, character
education, and rewards); FREDRIC H. JONES, POSITIVE CLASSROOM DISCIPLINE 298-300 (1987) (in-
school suspension); CHARLES H. WOLFGANG, SOLVING DISCIPLINE AND CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT
PROBLEMS: METHODS AND MODELS FOR TODAY'S TEACHERS 15, 196 (5th ed. 2001) (incentives and
contracting with students for improved behavior); Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School
(NCACPS): School Corporal Punishment Alternatives, http://www.stophitting.com/index.php?page=alt
ematives (last visited Nov. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Center for Effective Discipline, Alternatives] (a wide
range of alternative non-violent disciplinary strategies in schools).
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deprivation of privileges;521 reasoning; 522 negotiation and meditation; 523
in-school suspension; 52 4 parent pick-up; 525 letting a student suffer the
logical consequences, within reason, of his or her naughtiness; 526
Saturday schooling; 527 restitution;528 and detention. 529 Less austere
measures include providing a character education curriculum, 530
enlisting the assistance of school psychologists and counselors,53'
contracting with students for better conduct, 532 and engaging in peer
mediation. 
533
Pursuant to the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy paradigm, then, school
corporal punishment should meet with the Justices' ready censure under
the Eighth Amendment. The punishment does not aid deterrence, should
not aid retribution, and cannot but aid in wronging the nation's youth.
This analytical approach, though, does not exhaust the Court's options.
In the alternative or as a supplementary technique in exercising
independent judicial judgment regarding school corporal punishment
under the Amendment, the Court could also invoke the Trop standard
that governmentally imposed punishments may not run roughshod over
human dignity. 534 The concept of "human dignity" admits of several
shades of meaning. Webster's Dictionary defines "dignity" as "the
quality or state of being worthy, honored, or esteemed., 535 This
aggregation of synonyms, while not unhelpful, may be too
521. See F. Clark Power & Stuart N. Hart, The Way Forward to Constructive Child Discipline, in
ELIMINATING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: THE WAY FORWARD TO CONSTRUCTIVE CHILD DISCIPLINE 91,
109 (Stuart N. Hart et al. eds., 2005) (approving restrictions of privileges as a disciplinary tactic
sometimes used in Brazilian families); Kathleen Cotton, Schoolwide and Classroom Discipline,
NORTHWEST REGIONAL EDUC. LIBR. (1990), available at http://www.nwrel.org/scpd/sirs/5/cu9.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2008) (encouraging home-based reinforcement of student behavior through
deprivation of privileges, among other things).
522. See Power & Hart, supra note 521, at 91, 94, 100 (advising "educative procedures" to foster
children's development of a sense of right and wrong).
523. See id. at 112-13 (promoting negotiation and mediation processes for disciplinary purposes
as used in Philippine schools).
524. JONES, supra note 520, at 298-300; Center for Effective Discipline, Alternatives, supra note
520; Owen, supra note 465, at 89.
525. Center for Effective Discipline, Alternatives, supra note 520.
526. Power & Hart, supra note 521, at 115.
527. Owen, supra note 465, at 89.
528. Center for Effective Discipline, Alternatives, supra note 520.
529. Id.
530. HYMAN ET AL., supra note 520, at 18-19; Center for Effective Discipline, Alternatives, supra
note 520.
531. Center for Effective Discipline, Alternatives, supra note 520.
532. WOLFGANG, supra note 520, at 196; Owen, supra note 465, at 89.
533. Hilarski, supra note 472, at 70; Center for Effective Discipline, Alternatives, supra note 520.
534. See supra notes 452-60 and accompanying text.
535. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 354 (9th ed. 1989).
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impressionistic for purposes of legal analysis, without further
explication. What, after all, does it really mean to be worthy, honored, or
esteemed?
Immanuel Kant's discourses on human dignity mine the phrase with
more intellectual rigor. He conceived that humanity is only humanity
and the bearer of dignity if human beings are ends in themselves;
existing as a mere means to someone else's ends is a degradation. 536 In
contrast to his meditations on human dignity in general, Kant was very
much a man of his time (the eighteenth century) when it came to
disciplining children, at least insofar as he assumed physical punishment
was de rigeur.537 This fact does not, however, require the modem reader
to regress two hundred or so years and refrain from applying Kant's
concept of dignity to disciplining children in the twenty-first century.
Kant himself acknowledged that children too must be treated as the
bearers of dignity, even though he apparently did not stop to consider
whether corporal punishment of children could undermine that dignity.
"The child's duties.., consist in his being conscious that man possesses
a certain dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures, and that
it is his duty so to act as not to violate in his own person this dignity of
mankind. 538 Furthermore, Kant stated, it is quite against the child's
dignity "to be cringing in one's behaviour to others., 539 The Supreme
Court has, on occasion, described human dignity as an intact feeling of
personhood, 54 an insight dovetailing with the Kantian construct of
dignity as person cherished for being person. One commentator has
added the interesting gloss that assertions of "raw power" trample
human dignity, or personhood, underfoot.
541
This Article's definition of corporal punishment of children and
description of the ill effects thereof, make a potent case that such
punishment invades children's dignity. Inasmuch as this discipline is
gratuitous use of physical force upon a child so as to cause somatic
pain,542 the punishment necessarily discounts the child's personhood. He
or she becomes a convenient means to the adult punisher's ends of
unleashing pent-up anger or procuring a short respite from student
536. IMMANUEL KANT, Theory of Ethics, in KANT SELECTIONS 268, 309, 316 (Theodore Meyer
Greene ed., 1929).
537. See IMMANUEL KANT, EDUCATION 88 (Annette Churton trans., 1960).
538. Id. at 101 (emphasis omitted).
539. Id.
540. Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry
into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145, 167, 173, 178-79 (1984).
541. Id. at 168.
542. See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
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intransigence.543 For the punisher, the child's pain and trauma are
inconsequential to this process; any cringing before the upraised paddle
is considered, if noticed at all, to be merely incidental. 44 Children's
degradation appears to have reached its limit when a society ignores
corporal punishment's toxic effects, including the punishment's perverse
interference with children's development of conscience,545 and chooses
instead to perpetuate irrational brute force-raw power-as pedagogy.
As one perceptive student of the human heart has stated, "[t]here is a
moment in the history of every beaten child when his mind parts with
hopes of dignity-pushes off hope like a boat without a rower, and lets
it go as it will on the stream, and resigns himself to the tally stick of
pain.,
546
The argument that school corporal punishment constitutes an
indignity takes on particular pathos when viewed historically across
society. It is telling that the groups of people, besides children, who have
endured legalized corporal punishment have been enslaved or extremely
oppressed.54 7 The experience of slaves in the antebellum South is vividly
emblematic. Slaveholders were endowed with the prerogative of
physically coercing their African American "property"; 548  the
slaveholders were most partial to whipping to enforce submission.
549
The abuse did not cease with the Emancipation Proclamation 550 or the
Thirteenth Amendment. 551 During the Reconstruction era that followed
543. See supra notes 474-75 and accompanying text.
544. See id.
545. See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
546. SEBASTIAN BARRY, THE SECRET SCRIPTURE 90 (2008).
547. See generally GLENN, supra note 11, passim; PAGE SMITH, THE NATION COMES OF AGE: A
PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE ANTE-BELLUM YEARS 585, 615-16 (1981) (regarding corporal punishment
of slaves in the southern United States before the Civil War); Lloyd DeMause, The Evolution of
Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF CHILD ABUSE 1, 17, 41-43 (Lloyd
DeMause ed., 1974).
548. See Everette Swinney, Suppressing the Ku Klux Klan: The Enforcement of the
Reconstruction Amendments 1870-1877, in AMERICAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: A
GARLAND SERIES OF OUTSTANDING DISSERTATIONS 36-37 (Harold Hyman & Smart Bruchey
eds.,1987); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 78
(1988) (elucidating that many former American slaves so strongly associated slavery with corporal
punishment that they equated freedom with "abolition of punishment by the lash"). For further
descriptions of the pervasive flogging of American slaves, see JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE
COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 251 (1979); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, LIFE
AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 52, 121 (Bonanza Books 1962) (1892).
549. See FONER, supra note 548, at 78; Swinney, supra note 548, at 36-37.
550. Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268, 1269 (1863) (declaring that slaves "henceforward shall
be[] free").
551. U.S. CONST. amend. XIl, § 1 (stating that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction").
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the Civil War, vigilante groups like the Ku Klux Klan took advantage of
the complicity and fear of local authorities to intimidate freedmen, their
families, and sympathizers with a reign of terror. 552 The persecutors had
a weakness for tradition, most often cracking the whip to get their
message across.553 The bloodletting became so rampant that Congress
ultimately enacted a series of statutes in an effort to protect Blacks and
their supporters from the unrelenting corporal punishment.
554
This glimpse at the past is not intended to imply that children in the
United States effectively are, regardless of legal niceties, slaves. Rather,
the point is that, like the slaves, sailors, and prisoners of yore,555
American children can still be corporally punished with impunity,
including many students at school. 556 It is only our children who
continue to have this dubious distinction. 557 Such discrimination,
especially when set in the foreground of the historical tableau, raises a
perturbing question: Has legalized corporal punishment of children
persisted through the ages by an antecedent inequity in the way societies
have regarded children? 558 When, for instance, educators paddle
students, do they, unwittingly presume that the children are not full-
fledged members of the human race, not fully human, because all other
members enjoy legal protection from paddling? It would seem so, for
otherwise these adults would assuredly not feel free to do to their young
552. See FONER, supra note 548, at 425-36; DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY":
PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 24-28, 100 (1996); GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT
THERE WAS No PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 28-30 (1984).
553. "[W]hipping was the most common form of violence" used by the Ku Klux Klan in resisting
Reconstruction. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 53-54 (1985). "[O]ver the course
of two and one-half centuries corporal punishment became an accepted mode of dealing with
incorrigible Negroes. Following the war it would be difficult to forswear the use of such a proven
remedy for insolence and insubordination." Swinney, supra note 548, at 37. In the newly defeated
South, corporal punishment of Blacks remained a "habit [] so inveterate with a great many persons as to
render, on the least provocation, the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible." Carl Schurz, Report on
the Condition of the South, in SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ
279, 316 (Frederic Bancroft ed., 1913).
554. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14
Stat. 428; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Freedman's Bureau Act of 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat.
507.
555. GLENN,supra note 11,passim.
556. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
557. BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 6-8.
558. For work propounding the notion that many societies have viewed children as the property of
their parents, see, for example, JOHN C. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD: THE NEEDS AND RIGHTS OF
CHILDREN 18, 26, 39, 47-48 (1974); Mary Martin McLaughlin, Survivors and Surrogates: Children and
Parents from the Ninth to the Thirteenth Centuries, in THE HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD, supra note 547, at
101, 140; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'
Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747,1810-12 (1993).
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charges that which cannot be done legally to anyone else, i.e., physically
attack the children. If school personnel corporally punish students, then
there is a sense in which the students temporarily partake of the
subhuman; they are stripped of their personhood and shorn of their
human dignity.
559
The sorrow of children's dehumanization by corporal punishment is
scandalously exacerbated for African American students. Black children
in this country are recipients of a disproportionate amount of school
corporal punishment. 560 The figures are staggering. Statistics for the
2003-2004 academic year show that Black students were hit in school at
a rate that is more than twice their numbers in society at large. 561 This is
an allocation of school corporal punishment evocative of the violent
racism that once ravaged the American body politic. It is essentially a
holdover from slavery and from slavery's ugly legacy of racial
discrimination,562 and thus a particularly grave insult to African
American students' human dignity.
Ergo, when the Court brings its independent judgment to bear on
whether public school corporal punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the way seems
straight and clear. Under either the Atkins-Roper-Kennedy paradigm, the
Trop standard of dignity, or both, it is to be expected that the Justices'
respective lucubrations should lead them to a collective preference for
invalidation of the schoolhouse scourge. This would be truly principled
judging, above the tug of ideology or politics. It would be an act of
judicial courage, born not of preconceived conviction, but, rather, of
following where law and facts inevitably lead.
In sum, the component parts of Eighth Amendment analysis are in
such alignment that no astrologer could dare to hope as much for his
stars. More than a substantial majority of Americans want paddles out of
classrooms and off of children's bodies.5 63 The people and governments
559. BITENSKY, supra note 18, at 7-8; Susan H. Bitensky, Section 1983: Agent of Peace or
Vehicle of Violence Against Children?, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 371 (2001) [hereinafter Bitensky, Section
1983].
560. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 2004 CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION
(2007), http://vistademo.beyond2020.com/ocr2004rv3O/xls/2004Projected.html; E-mail from Elizabeth
Gershoff, Assistant Professor, School of Social Work, The University of Michigan, to Susan H.
Bitensky, Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law (Mar. 12, 2008) (on file with the
author) (interpreting the data from the Office of Civil Rights as showing that Black students are two and
a half times more likely to receive school corporal punishment than White students).
561. Id.
562. See Bitensky, Section 1983, supra note 559, at 371 (referring to antebellum abolitionists'
view that corporal punishment of slaves and children was an expression of the chattel status of both).
563. See supra notes 358 and accompanying text.
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of most other nations agree.564 International law teaches that school
corporal punishment is a human rights violation.565 Given recent
scientific findings and longstanding ethical concerns, the Justices of the
Supreme Court have every reason to see the punishment as violating the
Eighth Amendment as well. In any future relitigation of school corporal
punishment under the Amendment, the rule of law should impel the
Court to overturn Ingraham v. Wright566 and outlaw the punitive use of
bodily force on children in the public schools.
V. CONCLUSION
In making the legal case against public school corporal punishment
under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
these pages represent a valiant, if not always successful, attempt to avoid
preying upon readers' natural empathy for children or making other
appeals to emotion. The normative conclusions contained herein are
meant to be limited to those required by the Eighth Amendment's
analytical framework.
But throughout there lurks a pressing and emotionally charged
question that defies satisfaction with a legal job hopefully well done. It
is a question that whispers provocatively to us from Nelson Mandela's
insight that "[t]here can be no keener revelation of a society's soul, then
[sic] the way it treats its children. 567 Who, in the end, are we? Are we a
people who sincerely care for children? I do not mean only the children
we have given birth to or adopted, but, rather, children en masse. These
are, compared to normal adults, the most vulnerable among us. What
kind of people, speaking through their high Court, deprives children
when they are in school of the Eighth Amendment's protective mantle-
a mantle under which even the most callous convict can shelter?568
The Constitution can be likened to a mirror. "We the People, 569 look
into it and see ourselves as a national entity, reflected. The passage of
over three decades since the Ingraham decision is long enough to realize
that, as the fairy tale puts it, we perhaps are not "the fairest.., of [them]
all., 570 Fortuitously, dispassionate legal analysis under the Eighth
564. See supra notes 423, 428 and accompanying text.
565. See supra notes 375, 384-93,410 and accompanying text.
566. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
567. Foreign Policy Association, Children: Archive for the Notable Quotes About Children
Category, http://children.foreignpolicybiogs.com/category/notable-quotes-about-children/page/3/ (July
11,2008) (quoting Nelson Mandela).
568. See supra notes 179, 308 and accompanying text.
569. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
570. The Internet Movie Database, Memorable Quotes for Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs
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Amendment commands what common decency, self-respect, and a
hunger for humaneness and justice seek-that when children go to
school, their educators spare the paddle and teach that physical violence
is, now more than ever, a poor solution to the difficulties of human
relations.
(1937), http://imdb.coffItitle/ttOO29583/quotes (last visited Nov. 7, 2008).
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